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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
OCCURRENCE AND CONSEQUENCES OF SURPRISE INTERNAL CONTROL 
DISCLOSURES 
by 
Hambisa Belina 
Florida International University, 2018 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Kannan Raghunandan, Co-Major Professor 
Professor Dasaratha Rama, Co-Major Professor 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act mandates public companies to establish internal control 
systems and assess their effectiveness. Quarterly reports by all companies and annual 
reports by companies with less than $75 million public float (non-accelerated filers) do 
not require auditor’s attestation while annual reports by companies with $75 million or 
more public float (accelerated filers) do require such auditor attestations. Quarterly 
reports should provide early warning of any impending material weakness (MW) to be 
disclosed in subsequent annual filings. This dissertation explores three types of “surprise” 
MW disclosures—positive, negative and no surprise—and consequences of such surprise 
disclosures.  
In part one, I document the frequency of surprise MW disclosures and internal 
control factors that are associated with each surprise type by filer status. Results show 
that 78 (77) percent of accelerated (non-accelerated) MW disclosures are negative 
surprise MW disclosures during 2004-2016. Entity level MWs are more associated with 
no-surprise rather than negative or positive surprise MW disclosures.  
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In part two, I examine some consequences of surprise MW disclosures. The 
results show that companies with MW disclosures are more likely to dismiss their 
auditors and CFOs, and experience more shareholder voting against auditor ratification, 
compared to companies that issue clean reports. Auditor dismissal and CFO turnover are 
equally likely at negative and no-surprise MW disclosure companies. However, negative 
surprise accelerated filer companies’ shareholders are more likely to vote against auditor 
ratification than no-surprise accelerated filer companies. 
The third essay investigates the association between MW disclosures and audit 
fees. The results indicate that there is a significant positive association between audit fees 
and MW disclosures. Further, the results show that audit fees are higher at no-surprise 
companies than at negative surprise companies. 
The fourth essay focuses on audit report lag. The results indicate that MWs are 
associated with increased audit report lags, for both accelerated and non-accelerated 
filers. Further, surprise MW firms are more likely to experience increased audit report lag 
than no-surprise MW firms. 
Overall the results suggest that adverse internal control reports have 
consequences, and that the consequences vary between surprise and no-surprise MW 
firms. The results provide relevant empirical evidence to the ongoing debate on the 
necessity and efficacy of SOX Section 404 requirements.
vii 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In the aftermath of major accounting scandals at the beginning of this century, the 
United States Congress enacted “The Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor 
Protection Act of 2002,” also known as Sarbanes-Oxley Act (United States Congress, 
2002)  (SOX) to restore public trust in the capital market.  SOX Section 302 requires that 
the principal executive officer and the principal financial officer of all public firms certify 
their firm’s quarterly internal control disclosures. Section 404(a) mandates that 
management document and test the internal control structure and issue a report on the 
effectiveness of internal controls related to financial reporting. Section 404(b) requires that 
a registered public accounting firm attest the internal control assessment made by 
management. Policy makers believed that effective internal control helps companies to 
provide reliable financial statements that safeguard the company's assets, promotes 
efficient operations, and comply with laws and regulations. 
SOX Section 404 is not yet settled. The Dodd-Frank Act  (DFA, 2010) exempted 
non-accelerated filers from the auditor internal control attestation requirements of SOX 
Section 404(b); subsequently, Section 103 of the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act  
(JOBS, 2012) provided exemption from Section 404(b) requirements of SOX for 
“emerging growth companies.” Legislative efforts to curtail Section 404(b) continue; The 
latest version of the CHOICE Act, introduced in September 2016 by the Chairman of the 
House Committee on Financial Services and revised in February 2017, seeks to provide 
permanent exemption from Section 404(b) of SOX to issuers with market capitalization up 
to $500 million (McKenna, 2017; U.S. House of Representatives, 2017).  Thus, Section 
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404 of SOX continues to be controversial and legislators continue to seek exemption from 
the requirements of Section 404 for many smaller public companies. 
While Section 404 of SOX has attracted attention from legislators and regulators, 
Section 302 of SOX also deals with management reporting on internal control. SEC (2003) 
rules related to the implementation of Section 302 of SOX require that both the CEO and 
CFO certify about the effectiveness of disclosure controls and about material changes in 
internal controls over financial reporting. A key point to note is that, while Section 404 
applies only for (audited) annual 10-K filings, Section 302 requires certifications in 
(unaudited) quarterly 10-Q filings.  
The SEC (2003) notes that “there is substantial overlap between internal control 
over financial reporting and disclosure controls and procedures”.  SEC (2004) states that 
accelerated filers “carefully consider” whether material weaknesses discovered as part of 
their Section 404 testing be disclosed under Section 302 in interim periods. Financial 
statement users view the Section 302 rules as requiring prior disclosure about material 
weaknesses in Section 302 certifications before their disclosure in Section 404 filings 
(Glass Lewis & Co., 2005; Steinberg, 2005).  
In this dissertation, I examine the occurrence and consequences of surprise internal 
control disclosures in four interrelated essays. Specifically, I look at the frequencies, 
proportion, and consequences of surprise internal control material weakness (MW) 
disclosures using a sample of 36,627 firm-year observations from fiscal year 2004 through 
2016.   I define “surprise” MW disclosures as follows: (1) negative surprise when there is 
SOX 404 MW disclosure at year-end without SOX 302 MW disclosure during the 
preceding quarters of the same year; (2) positive surprise when there is SOX 302 MW 
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disclosure during the preceding quarters of the year but there is a clean SOX 404 report at 
year-end; and (3) no surprise when there is SOX 302 MW disclosure during the preceding 
quarters of the year and there is a SOX 404 MW disclosure at the year-end.  
This dissertation consists of four essays organized as follows. In Chapter II, I 
investigate the frequency of surprise MW disclosures, and internal control factors 
associated with each surprise type by filer status. In Chapter III, I investigate the 
association between surprise MW disclosures and audit committee (and the board) reaction 
to such surprise disclosures by examining subsequent auditor dismissal and CFO turnover. 
Further, I look at the association between surprise disclosures and the reaction by external 
users of such disclosures by investigating shareholders’ auditor ratification vote.  
In Chapter IV, I investigate the association between surprise material weakness 
disclosures and audit fee for accelerated and non-accelerated filers. In Chapter V, I study 
the association between surprise material weakness disclosure and audit report lags for both 
accelerated and non-accelerated filers. Finally, in Chapter VI, I end with a summary and 
discussions of the results of the earlier sections.  
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II. SURPRISE MATERIAL WEAKNESS DISCLOSURES: FREQUENCIES AND 
FACTORS 
 
In this part of my dissertation, I examine whether firms provide early warnings in 
their quarterly Section 302 disclosures about the impending internal control problems to 
be disclosed at the end of the year in Section 404 reports. The study aims to provide 
evidence on four interrelated questions. First, what is the proportion of firms with “negative 
surprise” disclosures in their Section 404 reports? Second, does the likelihood of “negative 
surprise” in internal control disclosures differ between accelerated and non-accelerated 
filers? Third, what proportion of firms provide early warnings in their Section 302 
disclosures and then issue a clean Section 404 report? Fourth, does the likelihood of such 
positive “surprise” differ between accelerated and non-accelerated filers? 
 
BACKGROUND  
Research on firms with Internal Control Deficiencies (ICDs) versus without ICDs 
As Figure 1, adopted from (Hermanson & Ye, 2009), shows extant research in the 
area of internal control compares firms with Internal Control Deficiencies (ICDs) against 
those without ICDs. Specifically, previous studies compare cells 1, 3, and 5 collectively to 
cells 2, 4, and 6 collectively (e.g., (Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, & Kinney, 2007); compare 
cells 1, 2, 3, and 5 collectively to cells 4 and 6 collectively, (e.g. (Doyle, Ge, & McVay, 
2007)); compare cells 1 and 2 collectively to cell 4 (e.g., (Krishnan & Visvanathan, 2007) 
and compare clean companies to problem companies – full sample of non-accelerated and 
accelerated filers, non-accelerated filers only, accelerated filers only, and accelerated filers 
analyzed separately by Section 302 versus Section 404 (Hoitash, Hoitash, & Bedard, 2009); 
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and compare cell 1 to cell 2 for accelerated filers during the fiscal year preceding the initial 
adverse Section 404 report (Hermanson & Ye, 2009).  
Hermanson & Ye (2009) find that in the first year of Section 404 reporting, many 
accelerated filer firms had ‘‘surprise’’ adverse Section 404(b) internal control reports. Such 
surprise firms file Section 404(b) filings disclosing material weaknesses (MW) in internal 
control at the end of the year but did not disclose MWs in their quarterly Section 302 filings 
during the same year. They find that only 27 percent of 451 accelerated filers with an 
adverse Section 404(b) audit opinion in the first year of Section 404 reporting provided 
early warning in their Section 302 certifications about such MWs in internal control, in the 
10-Qs filed in the previous quarters of the same fiscal year. Moreover, they find that early 
warning of ICDs are positively associated with the severity and number of material 
weaknesses, prior earnings restatements, auditor independence and effort, CFO change, the 
number of institutional investors, and the number of audit committee meetings, and 
negatively associated with future equity financing activities and CEO/board chair duality.  
Munsif, Raghunandan, & Rama (2013)  extend Hermanson & Ye (2009) by 
comparing cell 1 to cell 2 (see Figure 1) for accelerated filers as well as for non-accelerated 
filers. They find that 43% and 41% of accelerated filers with material weaknesses in their 
Section 404(b) reports disclosed early warning in their Section 302 reports in 2007 and 
2008, respectively. Moreover, they find that the proportion of non-accelerated filers with 
Section 404(a) adverse reports that provided early warning in their Section 302 filings were 
20% and 56% respectively for 2007 and 2008. They document that surprise disclosures are 
less likely for firms with (1) a higher number of MWs, (2) a new CFO, (3) more audit 
committee members, and (4) more frequent audit committee meetings. They also find that 
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there was a significant decrease in the likelihood of non-accelerated filers having a surprise 
MW disclosure in the second year of Section 404(a) reporting than in the initial year. 
Figure 1: Differences from Prior Research on Firms with ICDs versus without ICDs 
Report Adverse SOX 302 Disclosures Clean SOX 302 Disclosures 
Adverse 
SOX 404  
1. internal control weakness at 
year end; company warned of 
future 404 ICDs under 302  
“no-surprise” 
2. internal control weakness at 
year end; company did not 
warn of future 404 ICDs under 
302 “negative surprise” 
Clean SOX 
404  
3. interim ICDs were remediated 
before year-end “positive 
surprise” 
4. no internal control weaknesses, 
or company concealed interim 
ICDs and remediated the ICDs 
before year-end “clean” 
No SOX 404  5. non-accelerated filers 6. non-accelerated filers 
 
The present study compares cells 1 and 2 collectively with cell 4 in the full sample; 
compares cell 3 with cell 4 in the positive surprise sample; and cell 1 with cell 2 in the 
negative surprise sample.  
The intent of policymakers is that firms provide early warning reports about internal 
control over financial reporting so that financial statement users may insist on 
improvements on internal control over financial reporting (PCAOB, 2007). In a Keynote 
Speech at the 11th Annual Midwestern Financial Reporting Symposium, the then Chief 
Accountant of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) stated that: 
Our capital markets run on faith and trust that the vast majority of companies present 
reliable and complete financial data for investment and policy decision-making. 
Representing to the world that a company has in place an appropriate control system, 
free of material weaknesses, that gathers, consolidates, and presents financial 
information strengthens public confidence in our markets and encourages investment 
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in our nation's industries. If that's the case, then it's worth it, and it is absolutely 
critical that we get the internal control requirements right (Nicolaisen, 2004). 
 
The motivation for this study comes from the fact that internal control disclosures 
by public companies and their auditors continue to be of significant interest to legislators, 
regulators and academics. To this effect, this study extends Munsif, Raghunandan, & Rama 
(2013) and investigates whether firms provide early warnings in their quarterly Section 302 
disclosures about the impending internal control problems to be disclosed at the end of the 
year in Section 404 reports.  
 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Proportion of ‘‘Negative Surprise” Internal Controls 
Prior research has identified that the disclosure of internal control problems requires 
that the deficiencies must exist; that such deficiencies are discovered; and that the 
deficiencies are correctly classified and judged to be disclosed to the public (Ashbaugh-
Skaife et al., 2007; PCAOB, 2007). 
During the initial period of internal control disclosures there was substantial 
uncertainty as what constitutes “material weakness.” Such uncertainties might have 
resulted in management and auditors adopting differing thresholds for classifying internal 
control deficiencies as “material” and publicly disclose such internal control problems 
(Hermanson & Ye, 2009; Munsif et al., 2013; Rice & Weber, 2012). As management and 
auditors obtained more experience over a decade of Section 302 and Section 404 reporting, 
there is greater likelihood that (1) accelerated and non-accelerated filers can identify MWs 
earlier even without auditor involvement, and/or (2) judgement differences on 
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classification of internal control-related issues between clients and auditors would be less 
pronounced. Thus, the proportion of “surprise” adverse internal control reports during 
should decrease in the later years of SOX implementation. 
Conversely, (Rice & Weber, 2012) find that the proportion of firms providing early 
warning about accounting problems that force them to restate their financial statements is 
decreasing over time despite being subject to outside audit. Due to pressure from the capital 
market (Richardson, Tuna, & Wu, 2002)  and the complexity of the control environment 
(Rice & Weber, 2012), management may be inherently less likely to voluntary disclose 
MWs and may do so only when the auditor forces the disclosure during the year-end audit 
either through internal control attestation or the auditing of the financial statements. In 
either case, there may not be a significant decline in the proportion of “negative surprise” 
disclosures of MWs in later years Section 404 reporting. Ultimately, this is an empirical 
issue. Thus, the first research question is: 
RQ1 What is the proportion of companies with “negative surprise” MW 
disclosures in their Section 404 reports during the years 2004 through 2016? 
Proportion of “Positive Surprise” Internal Controls 
Section 302 disclosures are unaudited and such disclosures show management’s 
diligence. Non-accelerated filers are not subject to auditor attestation requirements of 
Section 404(b) and are required to file their internal control reports with only management 
evaluations of internal control pursuant to Section 404(a). Thus, there is no overriding of 
management’s judgments about when an internal control problem is material and, hence, 
requires disclosure. Therefore, it is less likely that there would be “positive surprise” MW 
disclosures of material internal control problems in the case of non-accelerated filers. 
9 
Conversely, there is significant adverse impact to disclosures of MWs under 
Section 302 (Beneish et al., 2008). Firms that disclose MWs under Section 302 experience 
abnormally negative forecast revisions and abnormally positive increases in costs of capital 
after their Section 302 disclosure.  
It is expected that as companies become experienced with SOX reporting and have 
longer time to strengthen internal control infrastructure the likelihood of firms finding and 
disclosing internal control problems in Section 302 reports will increase. Further, with 
time, companies’ capability to remediate interim ICDs before the year-end is expected to 
increase. Thus, this study also examines if there are any “positive surprises”—the 
likelihood of firms that disclose material weaknesses in their quarterly Section 302 
disclosures which are remediated during the year yielding clean Section 404 reports at the 
year-end. Thus, my second research question is:  
RQ2 What is the proportion of companies with “positive surprise” (i.e., clean 
Section 404 reports with Section 302 MW disclosures in earlier quarters) 
Section 404 reports in the years 2004 through 2016? 
 
“Negative” and “No-surprise” Internal Control Disclosures 
One potential explanation for the results in Hermanson & Ye (2009) and Munsif et 
al. (2013) is that differences in judgments, what constituted a material weakness that had 
to be publicly disclosed (as opposed to “significant deficiencies” that were not required to 
be disclosed), could plausibly explain the spate of “surprise” MW disclosures at the year-
end. For example, companies may have classified some internal control problems as 
“significant deficiencies” (not requiring public disclosure) while auditors may have been 
more conservative and classified the same as “material” (requiring disclosure). Hence, 
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differences between auditors and clients about the classification of internal control 
problems is a plausible reason for many surprise MW reports in the initial years of Section 
404 reporting. If this is the case, the internal control factors (issues) identified in negative 
surprise and no-surprise MW disclosures should be significantly different and be difficult 
for management to find and classify as material weaknesses. This leads to the third research 
question, about the differences in the internal control problems between negative surprise 
and no surprise MW disclosures. 
RQ3 Are the internal control issues in “negative surprise” Section 404 MW 
disclosures different from those in “no-surprise” MW disclosures?  
 
 “Positive” and “No-surprise” Internal Control Disclosures 
As noted above, positive surprise Section 404 disclosures refer to companies that 
had disclosed MWs in their Section 302 reports for earlier quarters of the fiscal year but 
had a clean Section 404 report at the fiscal year-end. In contrast, the no-surprise group of 
firms disclosed MWs in their Section 302 reports for the earlier quarters but did not 
remediate such problems before the fiscal year-end and hence had an adverse Section 404 
report at the year-end. Thus, both groups of firms had identified MWs earlier in the year, 
and the difference arises based on whether or not the identified problems had been 
remediated by the year-end. This provides us the opportunity to compare the types of 
Section 302 MWs between the two groups.  Thus, the fourth research question is: 
RQ4 Are the internal control issues in ‘‘positive surprise’’ Section 302 MW 
disclosures different from those in “no-surprise” MW disclosures? 
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SAMPLE 
I obtain SOX Sections 302 and 404 data and audit-related data (audit firm, audit 
fees, and opinions) from the Audit Analytics database. COMPUSTAT is the source for 
financial data, while other data are collected from the Securities Exchange Commission 
(SEC) website.1 I begin with management reports on internal control in Audit Analytics 
for 2004 thorough 2016.  
Panel A of Table 1 presents the sample selection. I start with 110,039 accelerated 
and non-accelerated filer companies with Section 404 reports for the years 2004 through 
2016 from the Audit Analytic database. Consistent with prior research, I delete 8,508 
foreign companies and 25,656 financial sector companies. Then I delete 33,894 companies 
with missing financial data and or assets less than one million.2  Further, I delete 138 
companies that had issued significant deficiency in their Section 302 disclosures and 
companies with restatements in the third quarter.3 I restrict the analysis to companies that 
did not have an adverse Section 404 report in any of the prior two years, to ensure that my 
analysis is not contaminated by prior year MW disclosures. Thus, I also delete 2,710 
companies that had MW disclosures during the preceding two years. Finally, I delete non-
accelerated filer companies before 2007 since Section 404 became effective for non-
accelerated filers on or after December 15, 2007. My final sample consists of 36,627 
companies: 29,134 accelerated and 7,493 non-accelerated filers.  I partition the analysis 
                                                          
1 I winsorize all continuous variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  
2 This is to prevent problems arising from small denominators causing extreme values of financial ratios.  
3 This is to ensure that surprise MW disclosures were not preceded by issues that were indicators of warning 
during the preceding quarters of the same year.  Significant deficiencies could be construed as warning and 
third quarter restatements might cause the year-end disclosures.    
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into accelerated and non-accelerated filers. This is because auditor attestation of internal 
controls is not required for non-accelerated filers. 
Panel B of Table 1 presents the breakdown of the accelerated filer companies. 
27,988 of the 29,134 accelerated filer companies have clean Section 404 reports, while 
1,146 of them have Section 404 MW disclosures. I further partition the 1,146 MW 
disclosures into 253 “no-surprise” MW companies that issued prior Section 302 MW 
disclosures during the year; and 893 “surprise” MW companies that did not disclose 
Section 302 material weaknesses. 
Panel C of Table 1 presents the breakdown of the non-accelerated filer companies. 
6,749 of the 7,493 non-accelerated filer companies have clean Section 404 reports, while 
744 of them have Section 404 MW disclosures. I further partition the 744 MW disclosures 
into 169 “no-surprise” MW companies that issued Section 302 MW disclosures during the 
year; and 575 “surprise” MW companies that did not disclose Section 302 material 
weaknesses. 
Panel D of Table 1 provides breakdown of the clean Section 404 companies for 
both accelerated and non-accelerated filer groups. The table shows that 325 (139) of 
accelerated (non-accelerated) filer companies with clean Section 404 disclosed MWs in 
Section 302 filings for the earlier quarters of the same fiscal year.   
In this and the following parts of my dissertation, I use the same sample to 
investigate the research questions and hypotheses developed in each part.  Hence, I do not 
discuss sample selection in each part this dissertation.  I partition the sample into three 
samples as in figure 2 on next page.  
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Figure 2: Sample Partition  
Sample Description Accelerated Non-Accelerated 
Full  
Section 404 MW vs. Clean 
Section 404 
29,134 
1,146 vs. 27,988 
7.493 
744 vs. 6,749 
Clean 
SOX 404 
Clean Section 404 with & 
without Section 302 MW 
27,988 
325 vs. 27,663 
6,749 
139 vs. 6,610 
MW  
Negative Surprise vs No-
surprise MW Disclosures 
1,146 
893 vs. 253 
744 
575 vs. 169 
 
RESULTS 
Frequencies of Negative, Positive and No Surprise MW Disclosures 
As seen in Table 1 Panel B, the total number of accelerated filers with an initial 
adverse Section 404 report in my sample is 1,146 for the years of 2004-2016. Consistent 
with prior research, I classify a company as having provided prior warning if one or more 
of the MWs that were disclosed in the Section 404 report was also mentioned in the prior 
Section 302 report. Table 1 Panel B shows that a total of 253 firms disclose similar internal 
control problems during prior quarters of the same year as those they later disclose in the 
year-end Section 404 reports. As noted earlier, I classify these 253 companies as “no 
surprise” MW firms. The remaining 893 companies are classified as “surprise MW” 
companies, since they failed to disclose MWs in Section 302 filings for prior quarters of 
the same fiscal year.  
The proportions of accelerated filers with Section 404 MW disclosures during the 
sample period is 3.9 percent (1,146 of 29,134). Considering only the MW companies, 78 
percent (893 of 1146) are surprise disclosures. Thus, only 22% (253 of 1146) year-end 
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Section 404 MW disclosures for accelerated filers had issued Section 302 MW during the 
preceding quarters of the year. The proportion of Section 404 surprise disclosures for 
accelerated filers are higher (p<.05) than the initial year disclosures reported in Hermanson 
and Ye (2009). 
As seen in Table 1 Panel C, the total number of non-accelerated filers with an initial 
adverse Section 404 report in my sample is 744 for the years of 2004-2016. A total of 169 
firms disclose similar internal control problems during prior quarters of the same year as 
those they later disclose in the year-end Section 404 reports. As stated above, I classify 
these 169 companies as “no surprise” MW firms. The remaining 575 companies are 
classified as “surprise MW” companies. The proportions of non-accelerated filers with 
Section 404 MW disclosures during the sample period is 9.9 percent (744 of 7,493). 
Considering only the MW companies, 77 percent (575 of 744) have surprise disclosures. 
Thus, only 23% (169 of 744) year-end Section 404 MW disclosures for non-accelerated 
filers had issued Section 302 MW during the preceding quarters of the same fiscal year. 
The proportion of Section 404 surprise disclosures for non-accelerated filers are higher 
(p<.001) than the initial year disclosures reported in Munsif et al. (2013). 
The results from Table 1 Panels B and C taken together show that even after a 
decade of SOX implementation, 78 (77) percent of accelerated (non-accelerated) filer 
companies with initial MW disclosures have “negative surprise” MW disclosures. These 
findings do not support arguments that the regulatory delays and learning processes of 
managers and auditors, in the initial years of SOX 404 reporting, were the reasons for the 
high proportion of surprise MWs in the initial years of Section 404 reporting. 
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Table 1 Panel D shows that 1.2 percent (325 of 27,988) of accelerated filers with 
clean Section 404 reports disclose MWs in Section 302 reports in preceding quarters of the 
year; these are “positive surprise” MW firms. The proportion of “positive” MW disclosures 
of non-accelerated filers (139 of 9,749, or 2.1 percent) is higher (p<.0001) than that of 
accelerated filers.  
 
Factors in Negative and No Surprise MW Disclosures 
Tables 2 and 3 present the frequency of occurrences of different types of issues for 
accelerated and non-accelerated filers in Section 404 and Section 302 MW disclosures by 
“negative surprise” and “no-surprise” categories. In all the tables, I use the disclosure 
categories as given in Audit Analytics. As shown in Table 2 and 3, there is no difference 
between negative and no-surprise categories in many of the MW issues suggesting that 
both groups are equally likely to be affected by the internal control issues. 
Table 2 shows the internal control factors that are reported by accelerated filer 
companies in Section 404 MW disclosures. Documentation related issues and year-end 
adjustments are typically pervasive and less sudden—and, thus, not a strong explanation 
for the surprise MW disclosures. As the table shows, no-surprise MWs were more likely 
(p < .05) to (1) have problems related to the quality and quantity of accounting personnel 
such as segregation of duties and ethical or compliance issues with personnel, (2) senior 
management competency, tone, reliability issues, (3) revenue recognition; income 
statement classification, margin and EPS; and inventory, vendor and cost of sales issues, 
(4) restatement or non-reliance of company filings, (5) information technology, software, 
security and access issues, (6) journal entry control, capitalization of expenditures, and 
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expense recording issues, and (7) deferred stock-based or executive compensation issues. 
These are unlikely to have developed suddenly at the year-end, and thus consistent with 
being more prevalent in no-surprise MWs. 
Table 3 presents the types of internal control problems disclosed for non-
accelerated filers by surprise category. As is in Table 2 for accelerated filers, accounting 
documentation, personnel-related problems, and unspecified FASB/GAAP issues are 
pervasive for surprise and no-surprise MW disclosing non-accelerated filer companies. 
Accounting documentation, policy and/or procedures are more likely (p<.1) at negative 
surprise MW disclosing non-accelerated filer companies.  Segregation of duties/design 
control (personnel) and expense recording are more likely (p<.1) at no-surprise MW 
disclosing non-accelerated filer companies. Internal control problems related to 
information technology, software, security & access issues; acquisition, merger, disposal 
or reorganization issues; depreciation, depletion or amortization issues; and journal entry 
control issues are more likely (p<.05) associated with no-surprise MW disclosures whereas 
material and/or numerous auditor /yearend adjustments are more likely (p<.01) related to 
surprise MW disclosing non-accelerated filers. This, again, is consistent with expectations 
that pervasive problems are more likely to be associated with no-surprise MW disclosures. 
 
Factors in Positive and No Surprise MW Disclosures 
Tables 4 and 5 present Section 302 MW issues with mean differences and p-values 
for “positive surprise” and “no-surprise” accelerated and non-accelerated filer companies, 
respectively. Both “positive surprise” and “no-surprise’ companies have MW disclosures 
during the prior quarters of the same year. The “positive surprise” groups remediate the 
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MW disclosed in Section 302 reports, hence, issue a clean Section 404 report at year-end, 
while the “no-surprise” group fail to remediate the MWs disclosed in their Section 302 and 
thus issue Section 404 MW disclosures at year-end.  
As shown in Table 4, many pervasive and less sudden issues such as revenue 
recognition; information technology, software, security & access; inventory, vendor and 
cost of sales; and restatement of previous 404 disclosures are more likely (p<.05) related 
to no-surprise MW disclosing accelerated filing companies than to “positive surprise” 
firms. 
As shown in Table 5, issues related to unspecified or unidentified or inapplicable 
FASB/GAAP (p<.01) and information technology, software, security & access are more 
likely (p<.05) related to no-surprise MW disclosing non-accelerated filer companies. 
Revenue recognition and deferred, stock-based or executive compensation issues are more 
likely (p<.1) at positive surprise than no-surprise MW disclosing non-accelerated filer 
companies. 
 
SUMMARY 
Section 404 of SOX continues to be controversial, with legislators seeking to 
increase the number of SEC registrants that would be exempt from the auditor attestation 
requirements of Section 404(b). The rationale underlying such efforts is that financial 
statement users can receive adequate information about internal controls without the costs 
associated with auditor involvement in such reporting. However, critics note that auditor 
involvement is essential for the timely disclosure of internal control problems. In this study, 
I provide some relevant empirical evidence for the debate surrounding Section 404 of SOX. 
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Two prior studies, examining initial years of Section 404 reporting by accelerated 
filers (Hermanson & Ye, 2009) and non-accelerated filers (Munsif et al., 2013), find that 
that many companies that disclosed material weaknesses in internal controls in their annual 
Section 404 reports did not provide early warning of such problems in their Section 302 
certifications for earlier quarters of the same fiscal year. Initial year implementation issues, 
including differences in expectations of managers and auditors during the learning phase 
of Section 404, offer one explanation for such surprise MW disclosures reported in the two 
prior studies. I extend such research by examining surprise MW disclosures during 2004-
2016.  
I find that 893 of the 1,146 (575 of 744) MW disclosures by accelerated (non-
accelerated) filers are surprise MW disclosures. The proportions of MW disclosures that 
were surprises are higher in my study, for both accelerated and non-accelerated filers, 
compared to the two prior studies noted above. Thus, the explanation offered for the 
findings in the two prior studies—namely, learning and initial-year implementation 
problems—cannot explain the high proportions of surprise MW disclosures during 2004-
2016, especially during the later years of SOX implementation. I find that such surprise 
MW disclosures are not driven by financial restatements during the fourth quarter, since I 
have excluded all restatements after in the third quarter.   
I find that a small number of clean Section 404 reports with 302 MW disclosures 
during the prior quarters of the year. The results show that the proportion of “positive” 
surprise disclosures of non-accelerated filers is higher than that of accelerated filers. 
I also find that Section 404 internal control problem factors in negative and no-
surprise MW disclosures are generally similar except that no-surprise MW disclosures 
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exhibit more personnel and systematic issues for both the accelerated and non-accelerated 
filer groups. Further, section 302 disclosure control problem factors in positive and no-
surprise Section 404 MW disclosures are generally similar, except that no-surprise MW 
disclosures exhibit more personnel and systematic issues for both the accelerated and non-
accelerated filer groups. 
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III. SURPRISE MATERIAL WEAKNESS DISCLOSURES AND AUDITOR 
DISMISSALS, CFO TURNOVER AND AUDITOR RATIFICATION VOTES 
 
 In this part, I examine some consequences of “surprise” Section 404 internal control 
material weakness (MW) disclosures by U.S. public companies. Hermanson & Ye (2009) 
refer to MW disclosures in Section 404 reports at the year-end without a prior MW 
disclosure in Section 302 reports for the prior quarters of the same fiscal year as “surprise” 
MW disclosures. I refer to such disclosures as “negative surprise” MW disclosures; further, 
I refer to MW disclosures in Section 302 reports during the first three quarters of the year 
without year-end Section 404 MW disclosures as “positive surprise” disclosures.  
Reports from the PCAOB (Franzel, 2016) indicate that adverse Section 404 
opinions have increased from 3.4 percent in 2010 to 6 percent in 2015. The same report 
also highlights that “consistent with prior years, the vast majority of public companies and 
other issuers with restatements had ‘clean’ ICFR opinion in that same fiscal year.” 
Motivation for my study comes from this continued trend and the continuing interest of 
legislators about the internal control reporting requirements pursuant to Section 404 of 
SOX (McKenna, 2017). 
In this study, I examine the consequences of surprise MW disclosures. Specifically, 
I investigate auditor dismissal, CFO turnover, and shareholder vote against auditor 
ratification after surprise MW disclosures.  I hypothesize that auditor dismissal; CFO 
turnover; and adverse auditor ratification votes would be higher for companies that disclose 
material weakness in internal control over financial reporting. I examine if poor internal 
control quality due to surprise disclosures has differential impact on auditor change, CFO 
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change and shareholders’ dissatisfaction of the auditor subsequent to surprise MW 
disclosures. 
 
BACKGROUND 
Prior Research on the Consequences of Material Weakness 
 Many prior studies have examined the consequences associated with Section 404 
MW disclosures. I briefly summarize the results from such studies below. 
 Gupta & Nayar (2007) use a sample of 90 firms from November 2003 to July 2004 
to examine whether internal control weakness disclosures convey valuation-relevant 
information to the US equity markets. They find that internal control weakness disclosures 
are associated with a negative stock price reaction. Hammersley, Myers, & Shakespeare 
(2008) use a sample of 358 Section 302 observation from November 2003 to January 2005 
to examine the stock price reaction to management’s disclosure of internal control.  They 
find that returns are significantly less negative if management concludes that internal 
controls are effective despite the presence of an internal control weakness and weakly less 
negative when the firm engages a Big Four auditor versus a smaller auditor. They also find 
that returns are significantly more negative when the internal control weaknesses are less 
auditable and when disclosures about them are vague.  
Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, Kinney, & LaFond (2008) use 1,281 Section 404 MW 
companies and 6,497 Section 302 reports with and without Section 302 MW disclosures 
for 2003-2005 and investigate the effect of internal control weaknesses on accrual quality. 
They find that companies with internal control material weaknesses have lower quality 
accruals.  Chan, Farrell, & Lee (2008) examine if firms reporting material internal control 
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weaknesses under Section 404 have more earnings management compared to other firms 
using a sample of 1,057. They find mild evidence that there are more positive and absolute 
discretionary accruals for firms reporting material internal control weaknesses than for 
other firms.  
Feng, Li, & McVay (2009) examine the relation between internal control quality 
and the accuracy of management guidance using 2,994 Section 404 reports from 2004 to 
2006. They find that firms disclosing ineffective internal controls have significantly more 
negative changes in return on assets suggesting that weak internal controls contribute to 
erroneous internal management reports and thereby larger management forecast errors. 
 Dhaliwal, Hogan, Trezevant, & Wilkins (2011) use 577 firm years from 2004-2006 
to examine the relationship between internal control weakness and cost of debt. They find 
marginal support for the hypothesis that weak internal control leads to higher cost of debt. 
Costello &Wittenberg-Moerman (2011) use 2,828 loans matched to Section 302 material 
weakness reports from 2002-2008 to examine the effect of financial reporting quality on 
the trade-off between monitoring mechanisms used by lenders. They find that lenders 
decrease their use of financial covenants and financial-ratio-based performance pricing 
provisions and substitute them with alternatives, such as price and security protections and 
credit-rating-based performance pricing provisions for companies that disclosing material 
weakness in internal control.  Kim, Song, & Zhang, (2011), use a sample of 1,363 
borrowing firms that disclosed internal control weaknesses under Section 404 and 3,164 
loan facilities, to compare features of loan contracts between firms with MW and those 
without MW. They find that (1) the loan spread is higher for MW firms than for non-MW 
firms by about 28 basis points; (2) firms with more severe, company-level MW pay 
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significantly higher loan rates than those with less severe, account-level MW; (3) lenders 
impose tighter non-price terms on firms with MW than on those without MW; and (4) 
fewer lenders are attracted to loan contracts involving firms with MW.  
Rice, Weber, & Wu (2015) examine various penalties that could serve as 
enforcement mechanisms for Section 404. They use a sample of 659 restatement 
observation, where 134 of them had Section 404 MW disclosures. They find no evidence 
that penalties are more likely for firms, managers, or auditors that fail to report existing 
control weaknesses. Instead, class action lawsuits, management turnover, and auditor 
turnover are all more likely in the wake of a restatement when control weaknesses had 
previously been reported. 
  Feng, Li, McVay, & Skaife (2015) examine the association between inventory-
related MWs and firms' inventory management using 8,953 observations from 2004-2009 
in Audit Analytics.  The authors find that firms with inventory-related MWs have 
systematically lower inventory turnover ratios and are more likely to report inventory 
impairments relative to firms with effective internal control over financial reporting.   
Sun (2016) uses 16,555 firm years from 2004-2012 and examines whether firm 
investment level is associated with the disclosure of MWs. She finds that MW firms have 
significantly lower investment than firms that receive clean opinions. 
All of the above studies examine the for-profit sector. In the non-profit sector, 
Petrovits, Shakespeare, & Shih (2011) examine the causes and consequences of internal 
control deficiencies in the nonprofit sector using a sample of 27,495 public charities from 
1999 to 2007. They find that the disclosure of weak internal controls over financial 
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reporting is negatively associated with subsequent donor support received and government 
grants.  
In summary, prior research shows that there are a variety of negative consequences 
associated with MW disclosures.  
 
Prior Research on Surprise Material Weakness Disclosures 
 As noted in the prior chapter, Hermanson & Ye (2009) use a sample of 451 
accelerated filers to examine if the companies have provided early warning in their Section 
302 reports during the three quarters of the same year. They find that: (1) management is 
more likely to provide early warning about more severe internal control deficiencies 
(ICDs), (2) management’s desire to secure future equity financing may result that some 
ICDs be concealed, and (3) that external auditor plays important role in the early warning 
of ICDs. They state that “providing early warning of ICDs under Section 302 results in 
more informative reporting to investors.” However, they find that only 27 percent of the 
451 accelerated filers that disclosed MWs in the initial year of Section 404 reporting had 
provided early warning of such MWs in quarterly Section 302 certifications before the 
fiscal year end. They extrapolate their findings to non-accelerated filers and note that, in 
the absence of auditor involvement in the internal control reporting process, they “seriously 
question whether market participants are fully informed about the effectiveness of many 
smaller companies’ controls.” 
Munsif et al. (2013) use a sample 198 (105) accelerated and 305 (296) non-
accelerated filers in 2007 (2008) to examine MW disclosures by accelerated and non-
accelerated filers based on the assumption that the three necessary conditions of existence, 
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discovery and classification of material weaknesses can differ between accelerated and 
non-accelerated filers. They find that majority of the MW disclosures by accelerated filers 
were “surprise” MW disclosures. They also find that, in the initial two years of compliance 
with Section 404(a) of SOX, a majority of non-accelerated filers also had surprise MW 
disclosures.  Specifically, they find that the proportion of management reports disclosing 
MWs in Section 302 increased from 20% in the first year to 56% in the second year for 
non-accelerated filers. Furthermore, they find that early warning is more likely for firms 
with (1) a higher number of MWs, (2) a new CFO, (3) more audit committee members, and 
(4) more frequent audit committee meetings. 
 
Related Research on Internal Control Problems and Auditor Dismissals 
Ettredge, Li, & Scholz (2007) examine the relationship between higher audit fees 
and auditor dismissals using a sample of 428 dismissal and 4,516 no-switch observations 
from 2004.  They find that clients paying higher fees are more likely to dismiss their 
auditors and that dismissals are associated with smaller companies, companies with going-
concern reports, and companies that later reported material weaknesses in their internal 
controls. 
Ettredge, Heintz, Li, & Scholz (2011) use a sample of 13,772 Section 404 reports 
from 2005 to 2008 to investigate whether adverse ICFR opinions are associated with a 
greater likelihood of subsequent auditor dismissals. They hypothesize that audit 
committees are more likely to dismiss incumbent auditors after receiving adverse Section 
404 opinions than after receiving clean opinions. Using a logistic regression, they find a 
positive association between adverse Section 404 opinion and auditor dismissal for all 
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years they studied indicating that when a firm receives an adverse ICFR opinion, the audit 
committee is more likely to dismiss the auditors. The authors conclude that their results 
indicate that internal control material weakness is a new, important, and perhaps enduring 
determinant of auditor dismissals. 
Hennes, Leone, & Miller (2014) examine the conditions under which financial 
restatements lead corporate boards to dismiss external auditors and how the market 
responds to those dismissal announcements using a sample of 2,036 restatements obtained 
from Audit Analytics (2006-2010) and U.S. General Accounting Office (1997-2006). They 
find that auditors are more likely to be dismissed after more severe restatements but that 
the severity effect is primarily attributable to the dismissal of non-Big 4 auditors rather 
than Big 4 auditors.  
 
Related Research on CFO Turnover 
 There is an extensive literature on executive turnover. In this section, I briefly 
discuss research related to CFO turnover in companies with financial reporting problems, 
including restatements and internal control problems. 
Desai, Hogan, & Wilkins (2006) investigate the reputational penalties to managers 
of firms announcing earnings restatements using 169 restament observation from U.S. 
General Accounting Office (GAO) for 1997 and 1998. They find that 60 percent of 
restating firms experience a turnover of at least one top manager within 24 months of the 
restatement compared to only 35 percent among age-, size-, and industry-matched control 
firms without a restatement.  
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Dao, Huang, Chen, & Huang (2014) using a sample of 1,485 firm–year 
observations that filed financial restatements in 2004 and 2005, examine whether firms 
replacing management after an initial restatement are more likely to experience subsequent 
restatements than those without management turnover. Their results suggest that 
management turnover may not help firms to remediate their financial reporting problems; 
instead, it is the change to a new management that leads to a higher probability of firms 
having lower earnings quality. 
Agrawal & Cooper (2017) examine the consequences of accounting scandals to top 
management, top financial officers and outside auditors using a sample of 518 U.S. public 
companies that announced earnings-decreasing restatements during 1997–2002 and an 
industry-size matched sample of control firms. After controlling for other determinants of 
management turnover, they find strong evidence of greater turnover of chief executive 
officers (CEOs) and chief financial officers (CFOs) of restating firms compared to the 
control sample.  
Li, Sun, & Ettredge (2010) use a sample of 2,478 companies: 416 receiving adverse 
SOX 404 opinions and 2,062 receiving clean SOX 404 opinions from 2005. They test the 
hypothesis that a CFO’s turnover is positively associated with a company’s prior receipt of 
an adverse SOX 404 opinion. Their results show that adverse SOX 404 opinion recipients 
experience more CFO turnover in 2005 as boards seek to improve the perceived credibility 
of their financial reporting. 
Johnstone, Li, & Rupley (2011) use a sample of 4,335 Section 404 reports from 
2004 to 2007 to investigate the association between MWs and board, audit committee and 
top management turnover. They find a positive association between disclosure of MWs 
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and subsequent turnover of members of boards of directors, audit committees, and top 
management, including the CFO. Wang & Huang (2013)  using a sample of 288 
observations (114 with internal control weakness and 174 control cases) investigate the 
association between CFO turnover and internal controls and find that companies with 
deficient internal controls are more likely to terminate their CFOs following financial 
restatements. 
 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Prior research shows that the majority of the companies reporting MWs in their 
SOX 404 opinions had “surprise” MW disclosures. As discussed in part one, I find that 
such surprise MW disclosures continue to be prevalent through the entire post-SOX period 
(2004-2016).  Why do such surprise disclosures of MWs happen, even a decade after SOX? 
This question is relevant, in light of the on-going legislative efforts to exempt more public 
companies from the requirements of Section 404(b) of SOX and since “providing early 
warning of ICDs [internal control deficiencies] under Section 302 results in more 
informative reporting to investors” (Hermanson & Ye, 2009). One possible explanation 
could be that surprise MW disclosures have no significant consequences to those in charge 
of making or auditing such disclosure decisions, namely CFOs and external auditors.  
Munsif et al. (2013, 187)  allude to this issue and note the following as a possible 
future research question: What are the consequences for firms that provide “surprise” 
disclosures about internal control problems, and to what extent are such consequences 
different compared to firms that do provide early warning about internal control 
problems? I address the above question in this part of my dissertation.  
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As noted above, prior studies show that there are adverse consequences to both 
auditors and CFOs following MW disclosures  (Ettredge et al., 2011; Ettredge et al., 2007;  
Johnstone et al., 2011; Li et al., 2010; Wang & Huang, 2013). Auditor dismissal is costly 
in terms of incremental managerial time and start-up fees paid to a new auditor for training 
and review or re-audit of prior years (AICPA, 1978; De Angelo, 1981; Beattie & Fearnley, 
1995). With longer tenure, auditors gain firm-specific knowledge and experience which 
makes changing auditors hard since clients’ fear of losing firm-specific expertise and 
efficiency developed by the incumbent auditor (Beck & Wu, 2006; Myers, Myers, & Omer, 
2003). The expertise of the incumbent auditor becomes more valuable as the size and 
complexity of a firm’s operations increase.  Prior studies also show that executives possess 
firm-specific human capital which makes them not easily replaceable (Leone & Liu, 2010; 
Villalonga & Amit, 2006). Start-up costs and availability of acceptable replacement would 
become increasingly constraining. Consideration of the cost of switching is likely to affect 
the probability of auditor dismissal and CFO turnover after surprise MW disclosures.  
 Audit committees have a significant role in the dismissals of auditors and CFOs.4 
If audit committees are concerned about failures to disclose the MW promptly, then auditor 
and/or CFO turnover should be more likely after “surprise” MW disclosures than after no-
surprise MW disclosures. However, if auditors and CFOs inform audit committees about 
the internal control problems during the fiscal year, the fact that the problem is classified 
as a “material weakness” at the year-end—necessitating public disclosure—may not be 
                                                          
4 Section 301 of SOX explicitly provides audit committees with the authority to hire and compensate the 
external auditor. In addition, given the role of the CFO in the financial reporting process, audit committees 
are typically involved in decisions to dismiss the CFO.  
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viewed as sufficient ground by itself to dismiss the auditor or the CFO. This is because 
decisions about whether a given problem is a “significant deficiency” that requires no 
public disclosure versus a “material weakness” that required public disclosure are 
inherently judgmental and can vary over time. This leads to my first set of hypotheses: 
H1a: Section 404 MW disclosure is positively associated with auditor 
dismissal and CFO turnover. 
H1b: The likelihood of auditor dismissal and CFO turnover would be higher 
for companies with Section 302 MW but positive-surprise Section 404 
disclosures when compared to companies with clean Sections 302 and 
404 disclosures.  
H1c: The likelihood of auditor dismissal and CFO turnover is the same for 
“surprise” and “no-surprise” Section 404 MW disclosures. 
 
Prior Research on Shareholder Voting on Auditor Ratification 
Raghunandan (2003) investigates the association between shareholders vote against 
or abstaining from ratification of the external auditor and the level of the non-audit fee paid 
to the external auditor using 172 of the Fortune 1000 companies. He finds that the 
proportion of shareholders voting against or abstaining from ratification of the external 
auditor is positively associated with the level of the non-audit fee ratio.  
Mishra, Raghunandan, & Rama (2005) examine the relation between shareholder 
ratification votes during 2003 using 248 of the S&P 1500 firms and non-audit services 
(NAS) fees. They find positive association between shareholder vote against auditor 
ratification and certain types of non-audit fees (tax fee and other fees), but not with audit-
related NAS fees.  
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Dao, Mishra, & Raghunandan (2008) use a sample of 635 companies to examine 
the association between shareholder votes on auditor ratification and the length of the 
auditor-client relationship. They find that shareholder votes against (or abstaining from) 
auditor ratification are positively correlated with auditor tenure suggesting that 
shareholders view long auditor tenure as adversely affecting audit quality. 
Using a sample of 240 companies with adverse internal control opinions and 240 
matched "clean" companies in their first year of Section 404 compliance, Hermanson, 
Krishnan, & Ye (2009) examine shareholders’ dissatisfaction with auditors that have issued 
adverse internal control opinions in the first year of the Section 404 implementation 
process. They find a significant positive interaction between restatement and company-
level material weakness—company-level material weaknesses have a greater effect on 
shareholder dissatisfaction when there has been a restatement. They also find that, when 
there is no restatement, shareholders are less likely to vote for auditor ratification if the 
company received an adverse Section 404 internal control opinion because of 
noncompany-level material weaknesses. 
Hermanson, Rama, & Ye (2017) use 104 instances of shareholder proposal to 
restrict non-audit service purchases by public companies from their independent auditors. 
Using a sample of 51 instances of shareholder vote on proposals seeking to restrict NAS 
purchases they examine the association between shareholder votes against the purchase of 
non-audit services and non-audit fee. They find subsequent reduction in the non-audit fee 
ratio is positively related to the magnitude of the proportion of votes in favor of the 
shareholder proposal to restrict non-audit fee purchase.  
32 
Using a sample of 6,621 firm-year observation with auditor ratification vote, Tanyi 
& Roland (2017) investigate the association between the proportion of shareholder votes 
against auditor ratification and investors’ perception of the auditor-client relationship. 
They find that lower shareholder approval of the auditor is associated with a negative 
market reaction to the 8-K announcement of the auditor ratification vote.  
Cunningham (2017) uses a sample of 9,003 observation in the Russell 3000 from 
2009 to 2012, examines the association between shareholder votes against auditor 
ratification and proxy advisors’ role.  She finds that proxy advisors have a statistically 
significant influence over shareholder voting outcomes when they recommend against 
auditor ratification.   
Barua et al. (2017)  use a sample of 12,664 company years during 2011-2014 to 
examine the association between shareholder votes on auditor ratification and subsequent 
auditor dismissals. They find that subsequent auditor dismissals become more likely with 
increases in the proportion of shareholders not ratifying the auditor.   
 
Shareholder Voting After Surprise MW Disclosures  
 Auditor dismissal and CFO turnover due to internal control problems is within the 
authority of the auditor committee (i.e., board of directors). In contrast, outside financial 
statement users are unlikely to be aware of the underlying internal control problems within 
a company. Hence, such financial statement users may be more likely to react adversely to 
surprise MW disclosures than to no-surprise MW disclosures.  
In this study, I focus on one measure of investor reaction to financial reporting 
quality. Shareholder voting on auditor ratification is an issue that has received significant 
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interest from regulators in recent years (Brown, 2012; Mayhew, 2017). Prior research 
shows that MW opinions are associated with shareholder voting related to auditor 
ratification (Hermanson et al., 2009). More generally, studies show that perceptions about 
audit quality are reflected in shareholder votes related to auditor ratification (Dao et al., 
2008; Raghunandan, 2003; P. N. Tanyi & Roland, 2017). I expect that shareholder 
dissatisfaction, as measured by shareholder voting on auditor ratification, would differ for 
companies with and without surprise MW disclosures. 
There are two differing arguments about how surprise MW disclosures would affect 
shareholder voting on auditor ratification. One view is that a surprise MW disclosure 
suggests that managers did not disclose the MW prior to the fiscal year-end—because of a 
lack of ability to detect or unwillingness to disclose—but the auditor involvement in year-
end testing is associated with such disclosure. If shareholders attribute such MW disclosure 
to either the superior detection capability of the auditor and/or the independence of the 
auditor to force managers to disclose the MW, then shareholders should be happier (or, less 
dissatisfied) with the auditor after a surprise MW disclosure compared to a no-surprise 
MW disclosure.  
A counter-argument, noted by Hermanson, Krishnan, & Ye (2009), is that 
“shareholders may blame the auditor for being partly responsible for the existence of 
material weaknesses (i.e., low audit quality).”5 Further, even though 10-Q filings to the 
SEC are unaudited, the SEC has required since 2000 that auditors review such quarterly 
                                                          
5 Sainty et al. (2002) suggest that shareholders are more likely to vote against auditor ratification when there 
is an “undesirable” audit report; these authors find that shareholder dissatisfaction is higher in the presence 
of a going-concern modified audit opinion. 
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filings; hence, investors may assign blame to the auditor for not ensuring early disclosure 
of the internal control problems in quarterly filings that leads to a surprise MW disclosure 
after the fiscal year-end. Under this view, shareholder voting against the auditor would be 
higher for the surprise-MW disclosures. Ex-ante, it is not clear which of the above two 
effects would dominate; ultimately, this is an empirical issue. Thus, my second set of 
hypotheses is: 
H2a: Shareholder votes not ratifying the auditor is higher for companies with 
Section 404 MW disclosure than for companies without Section 404 MW 
disclosure. 
H2b: Shareholder votes not ratifying the auditor would be higher for 
companies with Section 302 MW but with positive-surprise Section 404 
disclosures when compared to companies with clean Sections 302 and 
404 disclosures. 
H2c: Shareholder votes not ratifying the auditor would not be different for 
companies with negative surprise Section 404 MW disclosure when 
compared to companies with no-surprise Section 404 MW disclosure. 
 
AUDITOR DISMISSALS AFTER SURPRISE MW DISCLOSURES 
METHOD 
I use a logistic regression model to examine the association between subsequent 
auditor dismissals and (a) Section 404 disclosures of MWs compared to clean Section 404 
reports, (b) Section 302 disclosures of MWs compared to clean Section 302 reports for 
clean Section 404 reports, and (c) negative surprise vs. no surprise MW disclosures. My 
regression model controls for other factors that are associated with auditor changes. Based 
on prior studies (Barua et al., 2017; Carcello & Neal, 2003; Ettredge et al., 2011; Ettredge 
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et al., 2007; Hennes et al., 2014) I control for financial, auditor, and executive 
characteristics shown to be associated with auditor dismissals.  
The logistic regression model is:  
AUDIS  =     0 + 1*MW (PSURP / SURP) + 2*LNTA + 3*LEV + 4*ROA + 
5*BM +6*GROWTH + 7*LOSS + 8*GC + 9*BIG4 +    
10*NEWCEO + 11*NEWCFO + α12*LNTEN + 13*REST + 
year + industry + error     
(1) 
The dependent variable in the above model, AUDIS, equals 1 if there is an auditor 
dismissal within one-year of a MW disclosure and 0 otherwise. I first use the full-sample 
and examine the difference between companies with clean Section 404 opinions and 
companies with Section 404 MW disclosures: the variable of interest here is MW, which 
equals 1 for companies with MW disclosures and 0 otherwise. In the second regression, 
the sample includes companies with clean Section 404 reports: the variable of interest here 
is PSURP which equals 1 if there is Section 302 MW disclosure during the preceding 
quarters of the year and 0 if there is no Section 302 MW disclosure. In the third regression, 
the sample includes only the MW companies: the variable of interest here is SURP which 
equals 1 if there is a negative surprise MW disclosure and 0 if there is no-surprise MW 
disclosure. All the other variables are defined in the appendix. I winsorize continuous 
variables at the 1st and the 99th percentiles.  The data selection is presented in Table 1. 
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RESULTS 
Accelerated Filers 
Table 6 presents the mean differences between companies with Section 404 MW 
disclosures and clean Section 404 opinions, clean Section 404 firms with and without prior 
Section 302 MW disclosures, and negative surprise and no-surprise MW disclosures for 
accelerated filers. Consistent with prior research, I find that companies with Section 404 
MW disclosures, when compared to companies with clean Section 404 reports, are (a) 
smaller, (b) have worse financial performance and are in worse financial condition, (c) 
more likely to dismiss its external auditor, (d) more likely to receive going concern opinion, 
(e) less likely to be audited by the Big 4, (f) more likely to have an auditor with less tenure, 
and (g) more likely to have restatements.  Table 6 also shows that in the subset of 
companies with a clean Section 404 report, companies with Section 302 MW disclosures, 
when compared to companies with clean Section 302 reports, are (a) smaller, (b) have 
worse financial performance and are in worse financial condition, (c) more likely to have 
restatements in the last three years and (d) more likely to dismiss their auditors. Finally, 
when considering only the group of Section 404 MW companies, the mean values of the 
control variables generally do not differ based on the “surprise” status for negative surprise 
and no-surprise group, except that negative surprise companies are (a) likely to have lower 
leveraged, (b) less likely to have going concern opinion, (c) less likely to have a new CFO 
and (d) less likely to have had restatements in the last three years, than the no-surprise 
companies. 
The first 2x2 table of Panel A of Table 7, shows that 134 of 1146 accelerated filer 
companies with MW disclosures (11.7 percent) dismissed the auditor within the subsequent 
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year. In contrast, 927 of 27,988 accelerated filer companies (3.3 percent) with clean Section 
404 opinions dismissed the incumbent auditor within one year after the MW disclosure. 
The difference is statistically significant (p < .0001). The second 2x2 table in Panel A of 
Table 7 shows that 23 of 325 accelerated filer companies with a positive-surprise MW 
disclosure (7.1 percent) dismissed the incumbent auditor within one year after the end of 
the year. In the control group, 904 of 27,663 accelerated filer companies (3.3 percent) 
dismissed the auditor within one year. The difference is statistically significant (p<.001). 
The last 2x2 table in Panel A of Table 7 shows that 104 of 893 accelerated filer companies 
(11.7 percent) dismissed the auditor within one year in the negative surprise MW group. 
In the no-surprise group, 30 of 253 accelerated filer companies (11.9 percent) dismissed 
the incumbent auditor within one year after Section 404 MW disclosure. The difference is 
not significant. 
Panel B of Table 7 provides the results from the logistic regression models. 
Consistent with prior research, the MW variable is positive and significant in the first 
model. Thus, accelerated filer companies with an MW disclosure are more likely 
subsequently to dismiss the auditor when compared to companies with clean Section 404 
opinions. Panel B of Table 7 also shows the second regression—a sample of clean Section 
404 reports with and without prior Section 302 MW disclosure. The PSURP variable is 
positive and significant in the second regression. Thus, accelerated filer companies with 
Section 302 MW disclosure are more likely subsequently to dismiss the auditor when 
compared with accelerated filer companies with clean Section 302 reports. In the third 
regression in Panel B of Table 7, using only the MW sample, the variable of interest 
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(SURP) is not significant. Thus, negative- and no-surprise Section 404 MW disclosure 
accelerated filer companies are equally likely subsequently to dismiss the auditor. 
 
Non-Accelerated Filers 
Table 8 presents the mean differences between companies with MW SOX 404 
disclosures and clean SOX 404 opinions, clean SOX 404 firms with and without prior SOX 
302 MW disclosures, and surprise and no-surprise MW disclosures, for non-accelerated 
filers. Consistent with prior research, I find that companies with SOX MW disclosures, 
when compared to companies with clean SOX 404 reports, are (a) smaller, (b) have worse 
financial performance and are in worse financial condition, (c) more likely to dismiss 
external auditor, (d) more likely to receive going concern opinion, (e) less likely to be 
audited by the Big 4, (f) more likely to have an auditor with less tenure, and (g) more likely 
to have restatements. Table 8 also shows that, in the clean SOX 404 sample, companies 
with Section 302 MW disclosures compared to companies with clean SOX 302 reports, are 
(a) smaller, (b) have worse financial performance and are in worse financial condition, (c) 
more likely to have restatements in the last three years and (d) more likely to dismiss their 
auditors. Finally, considering only the group of Section 404 MW firms, the mean values of 
the control variables generally do not differ between the negative surprise and no-surprise 
groups, except that no-surprise companies are more likely to have had restatements in the 
last three years than negative surprise companies. 
The first 2x2 table, on the left-hand side of Table 9, shows that 89 of the 744 
companies with MW disclosures (12.0 percent) dismissed the incumbent auditor within 
one year after the MW disclosure; in contrast, 388 of the 6,748 non-accelerated filer 
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companies (5.8 percent) with clean Section 404 opinions dismissed the auditor within the 
subsequent one year. The difference is statistically significant (p < .0001). The second 2x2 
table of Table 9 also shows the proportion of auditor dismissal for the clean SOX 404 
sample.  22 of the 139 of non-accelerated filer companies with Section 302 MW disclosure 
(15.8 percent) dismissed the incumbent auditor within one year after the end of the year. 
In the clean Section 302 report, 366 of the 6509 companies (5.5 percent) dismissed the 
auditor within one year. The difference is statistically significant (p<.0001). The third 2x2 
table of Table 9 also shows that 67 of the 575 surprise MW companies (11.7 percent) 
dismissed the auditor within one year. Whereas, 22 of the 169 no-surprise MW companies 
(13.0 percent) dismissed the incumbent auditor within one year after the MW disclosure. 
The difference is not significant. 
The first regression in Panel B of Table 9 provides the results from the logistic 
regression models for the non-accelerated filer sample. Consistent with prior research, the 
MW variable is positive and significant in the first model. Thus, non-accelerated filer 
companies with an MW disclosure are more likely subsequently to dismiss the auditor 
when compared to non-accelerated filer companies with clean Section 404 opinions. The 
second regression in Panel B of Table 9 uses the sample of clean Section 404 reports with 
and without prior Section 302 MW disclosure. The PSURP variable is positive and 
significant in the second regression. Thus, non-accelerated filer companies with Section 
302 MW disclosure are more likely subsequently to dismiss the auditor when compared 
with companies with clean Section 302 reports. In contrast, the third regression in Panel B 
of Table 9 shows that the variable of interest (SURP) is not significant for the MW sample; 
40 
thus, there is no significant difference in auditor dismissal between the surprise and no-
surprise MW non-accelerated filer companies. 
Overall, the regression results strongly suggest that, given a Section 404 MW 
disclosure, subsequent dismissals of the incumbent auditor are equally likely at companies 
with and without surprise negative MW disclosures. My conjecture is that this is so because 
in both groups of companies the audit committee is likely aware of the underlying internal 
control problems during the fiscal year. While it is reasonable to expect that, audit 
committees would react negatively to negative surprises, internal control decisions involve 
significant professional judgment that evolves over time. Hence, auditors can plausibly 
explain the year-end negative surprise MW disclosure; this in turn results in no additional 
likelihood of dismissal for the auditors of surprise MW companies, when compared to 
auditors of the no-surprise MW companies. 
 If the above argument is valid, then I should similarly expect no differences 
between surprise and no-surprise MW companies in the turnover of CFOs following an 
initial Section 404 MW disclosure. If the audit committees—and, presumably, the rest of 
the board—are aware of the underlying internal control issues before the fiscal year-end, 
then the fact that the year-end Section 404 MW disclosure is a “surprise” should not by 
itself result in a higher likelihood of CFO turnover for the surprise MW companies when 
compared to the group of no-surprise MW companies. I investigate this issue below. 
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 CFO TURNOVER AFTER SURPRISE MW DISCLOSURES 
METHOD 
I use a logistic regression model to examine the association between subsequent 
CFO changes and (a) the disclosures of MWs compared to clean Section 404 reports, (b) 
clean SOX 404 disclosures with and without SOX 302 MW disclosures (i.e., between 
positive-surprise companies and control companies), and (c) negative-surprise vs. no 
surprise MW disclosures. My regression model controls for other factors that can be 
associated with CFO changes; the control variables are based on prior studies (Gietzmann, 
Marra, & Pettinicchio, 2016; K. Johnstone et al., 2011; Li et al., 2010; Wang & Huang, 
2013) and control for financial and executive characteristics shown to be associated with 
CFO changes.  The logistic regression model is: 
CFOCHG =     β0 + β1*MW (PSURP / SURP) + β2*ROA + β3*LEV + β4*SEGS + 
β5*REST + β6*M&A + β7*SIZEQ + β8*YOUNG + β9*DIS +  
β10*GROWTH + β11*CEO_CHAIR + year + industry + error                    
(2) 
The dependent variable in the above model, CFOCHG, equals 1 if there is a CFO 
turnover within one-year of a MW disclosure and 0 otherwise. I first use the full-sample 
and examine the difference between companies with clean Section 404 opinions and 
companies with MW disclosures: the variable of interest here is MW, which equals 1 for 
companies with MW disclosures and 0 otherwise. In the second regression, the sample 
includes companies with clean Section 404 reports: the variable of interest here is PSURP 
which equals 1 if there is Section 302 MW disclosure during the preceding quarters of the 
year and 0 if there is no Section 302 MW disclosure. In the third regression, the sample 
includes only the MW companies: the variable of interest here is SURP which equals 1 if 
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there is a surprise MW disclosure and 0 if there is a no-surprise MW disclosure. All the 
other variables are defined in the appendix. I winsorize continuous variables at the 1st and 
the 99th percentiles.  The data selection is presented in Table 1. 
 
RESULTS 
Accelerated Filers 
Table 10 presents the mean differences between (a) companies with MW SOX 404 
disclosures and clean 404(b) opinions, (b) clean 404(b) firms with and without prior 
Section 302 MW disclosures, and (c) negative surprise and no-surprise MW disclosures 
for accelerated filers. Consistent with prior research, I find that companies with MW 
disclosures, when compared to companies with clean SOX 404 reports, are (1) have worse 
financial performance and are in worse financial condition, (2) more likely to dismiss their 
CFO, (3) less likely to have a CEO who also is the chairman of the board, (4) more likely 
to have fewer operating segments, (5) more likely to have had accounting restatements in 
the last three years, (6) more likely to be larger companies as measured by size decile,  and 
(7) more likely to have sales growth. In the clean SOX 404 sample, companies with Section 
302 MW disclosures when compared to companies with clean SOX 302 reports, have 
similar characteristics as Section 404 MW companies as explained in above paragraph. 
However, there is no significant difference between clean Section 404 with and without 
Section 302 MW disclosures in sales growth. Finally, considering only the MW companies, 
the mean values of the control variables generally do not differ based on the “surprise” 
status, except that no-surprise companies are (a) more likely to be more leveraged, (b) more 
likely to have had restatements over the last three years, and (c) more likely younger than 
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negative surprise companies. Furthermore, negative surprise companies are more likely to 
have a CEO who is also the chairman of the board.   
Panel A of Table 11 provides details about the univariate association between the 
three samples and subsequent CFO changes for accelerated filer companies. The first 2x2 
table of Panel A of Table 11, shows that 304 of the 1146 companies with MW disclosures 
(26.5 percent) had a CFO change within one year of the MW disclosure.  In contrast, 4,282 
of the 27,988 companies (15.3 percent) with clean Section 404 opinions had CFO change 
within the subsequent year. The difference is statistically significant (p < .0001). The 
middle 2x2 table of Panel A of Table 11 shows that 61 of the 325 clean Section 404 
accelerated filer companies with Section 302 MW during the preceding quarters of the year 
(18.8 percent) had CFO turnover within one year of the MW disclosure. In the accelerated 
filer companies with clean Sections 302 and 404, 4,221 of the 27,663 companies (15.3 
percent) had CFO change within one year. The difference is statistically significant (p<.1). 
The last 2x2 table of Panel A of Table 11 also shows that 227 of the 893 accelerated filer 
companies with a surprise MW disclosure (25.4 percent) had CFO change turnover within 
one year of the MW disclosure. Finally, 77 of the 253 no-surprise MW companies (30.4 
percent) had CFO change within one year. The difference is not significant. 
 Panel B shows that, when considering the full sample of accelerated filers, the 
overall regression model is significant (p < .001). The coefficient of MW is positive and 
significant, indicating that subsequent CFO changes are more likely in companies with 
MW disclosures when compared to companies with clean Section 404 opinions. However, 
the second and third regressions in Panel B of Table 11, using only clean Section 404 
accelerated filers with and without Section 302 MW disclosures and the MW companies, 
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are not significant. The coefficient of PSURP and SURP are also not significant in the 
model. Section 302 MW disclosures during the preceding quarters of the same year does 
not lead to greater CFO turnover for clean Section 404 accelerated filers. Likewise, given 
a Section 404 MW disclosure, there appears to be no significant difference between MW 
firms with and without a surprise disclosure for the likelihood of CFO turnover in the year 
following the MW disclosure. 
 
Non-Accelerated Filers 
Table 12 presents the mean differences between (a) companies with MW SOX 404 
disclosures and clean SOX 404, (b) clean SOX 404 firms with and without prior Section 
302 MW disclosures, and (c) surprise and no-surprise MW disclosures for non-accelerated 
filers. Results for SOX 404 MW disclosures and clean SOX 404 reports are similar to 
results for the accelerated filers presented in Table 10. In contrast to Table 10, 
CEO_CHAIR is not significantly different between SOX 404 MW and clean SOX 404 
reports. In addition, SOX 404 MW non-accelerated filer companies are more leveraged and 
have more M&A than clean SOX 404 companies. Table 12 also shows that, in the clean 
SOX 404 sample, companies with Section 302 MW disclosures when compared to 
companies with clean SOX 302 reports, have similar characteristics as Section 404 MW 
companies. However, there is no significant difference between clean Section 404 with and 
without Section 302 MW disclosures in sales growth (GROWTH), CFO turnover 
(CFOCHG), merger and acquisition (M&A), and CEO Chair duality (CEO_CHAIR). 
Finally, for MW sample, the mean values of the control variables generally do not differ 
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based on the “surprise” status except that no-surprise companies are (a) more likely to be 
younger, and (b) more likely to have had restatements over the last three years. 
The first 2x2 table, on the left-hand side Panel A of Table 13, shows that 170 of the 
744 companies with MW disclosures (22.9 percent) had a CFO change within one year of 
the MW disclosure. In contrast, 1,099 of the 6,749 non-accelerated companies (16.3 
percent) with clean Section 404 opinions had CFO change within the subsequent year. The 
difference is statistically significant (p < .0001). The middle 2x2 table of Panel A of Table 
13 shows that 22 of the 139 clean Section 404 accelerated filer companies with Section 
302 MW during the preceding quarters of the year (15.8 percent) had CFO change within 
one year of the MW disclosure. In the non-accelerated filer companies with clean Sections 
302 and 404 reports, 1,077 of the 6,610 companies (16.3 percent) had CFO change within 
one year. The difference is not statistically significant. Finally, the last 2x2 in Panel A of 
Table 13 also shows that 131 of the 575 accelerated filer companies with a surprise MW 
disclosure (22.8 percent) had CFO turnover within one year of the MW disclosure. In the 
no-surprise MW group, 39 of the 169 companies (23.1 percent) had CFO change within 
one year. Here again, the difference is not significant. 
Panel B shows that, when considering the full sample of non-accelerated filers, the 
overall regression model is significant (p < .05). The coefficient of MW is positive and 
significant, indicating that subsequent CFO changes are more likely in companies with 
MW disclosures when compared to companies with clean Section 404 opinions. However, 
the second and third regressions in Panel B of Table 13, using only clean Section 404 non-
accelerated filers with and without Section 302 MW disclosures and the MW companies, 
are not significant. The coefficient of PSURP and SURP are also not significant in the 
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model. This indicates that Section 302 MW disclosures during the preceding quarters of 
the same year do not lead to CFO turnover for clean Section 404 non-accelerated filers. 
Likewise, given a Section 404 MW disclosure, there appears to be no significant difference 
between SOX 404 MW non-accelerated firms with and without a surprise disclosure for 
the likelihood of CFO turnover in the year following the MW disclosure. 
In summary, in terms of consequences, neither auditor dismissal nor CFO turnover 
differs between negative surprise and no-surprise firms in the year after a Section 404 MW 
disclosure. These results are consistent with my conjecture that since audit committees are 
likely aware of the underlying internal control problem during the year, the absence of prior 
warning can be excused on the grounds that such judgments necessarily involve 
professional judgments which can evolve over time. 
 
SHAREHOLDER VOTING AFTER SURPRISE MW DISCLOSURES 
METHOD 
I use a multiple regression model to examine the association between shareholder 
voting on auditor ratification and (a) the disclosures of MWs compared to clean Section 
404 reports, (b) in the subset of companies with clean Section 404 opinions, the disclosures 
of MWs in Section 302 filings compared to clean Section 302 reports, and (c) surprise vs. 
no surprise MW disclosures. The control variables are based on prior studies and control 
for financial and audit characteristics shown to be associated with shareholder voting (Dao 
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et al., 2008; Raghunandan, 2003; Sainty, Taylor, & Williams, 2002; Tanyi & Roland, 
2017).6  The OLS regression model is: 
The dependent variable in the above regression, VOTE, is the natural log of the 
proportion of shareholder votes against, or abstaining from, auditor ratification. As before, 
I first use the full-sample and examine the difference between companies with Section 404 
MW and companies with clean opinions: the variable of interest here is MW. In the second 
regression, the sample includes companies with clean Section 404 reports with and without 
SOX 302 MW disclosures. The variable of interest here is PSURP which equals 1 if there 
is Section 302 MW disclosure during the preceding quarters of the year and 0 if there is no 
Section 302 MW disclosure. In the third regression, the sample includes only the MW 
companies. The variable of interest here is SURP which equals 1 if SOX 404 MW 
disclosure is a surprise (i.e., without SOX 302 MW during the preceding quarters of the 
year), and 0 if SOX 404 MW disclosure is not a surprise. All the other variables are defined 
in the appendix. I winsorize continuous variables at the 1st and the 99th percentiles.  The 
data selection is presented in Table 1. 
                                                          
6 Note that the sample size for the voting analysis is smaller than that in Tables 7 and 9. Prior studies show 
that shareholder voting, which is voluntary, is much less likely in smaller companies (Hermanson et al. 
2009; Dao et al. 2012). 
 
VOTE = θ0+θ1*MW (PSURP / SURP)+ θ2*LNTA + θ3*BIG4 + θ4*NASR+ 
θ5*LNTEN + θ6*GC + θ7*REST + θ8*LOSS + θ9*GROWTH + 
θ10*ROA + year + industry + error 
(3) 
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I examine the shareholder ratification votes that occur in the fiscal year after the 
initial MW disclosure. Since most shareholder votes occur during the second quarter of the 
fiscal year, most of the votes occur within four months of the 10-K filing that includes the 
MW disclosure. I delete companies that had an auditor change at any time during the 365 
days before the vote date; this is to reduce the effects that may be attributable to auditor 
change following the MW disclosure in the annual or quarterly filings.  
Consistent with prior research (Barua et al., 2017; Dao et al., 2008; Raghunandan, 
2003), I use the ratio of number of votes against, or abstaining from, auditor ratification as 
the numerator and the total number of votes cast as the denominator to calculate 
shareholder dissatisfaction. Further, again following prior research, given the skewness in 
the distribution of the vote proportion, I take the natural logarithm of the vote proportion 
to arrive at my dependent variable for the analysis, VOTE. 
 
RESULTS 
Accelerated Filers 
Table 14 presents the mean differences between companies with MW SOX 404 
disclosures and clean 404(b) opinions; clean 404(b) firms with and without prior Section 
302 MW disclosures; and surprise and no-surprise MW disclosures for accelerated filers. 
Consistent with prior research, I find that companies with MW disclosures, when compared 
to companies with clean SOX 404 reports, are (1) in worse financial condition and have 
worse financial performance, (2) more likely to smaller, (3) more likely to have shorter 
auditor tenure, (4) more likely to have going concern modified audit opinion, (5) less likely 
to be audited by Big 4 auditors, (6) less likely to purchase non-audit services, (7) more 
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likely to have sales growth, and (9) more likely to have had restatements in the last three 
years. There is no difference in the proportion of votes against or abstaining from auditor 
ratification between Section 404 MW and clean Section 404 companies. In the clean SOX 
404 sample, companies with Section 302 MW disclosures when compared to companies 
with clean SOX 302 reports, have similar characteristics as Section 404 MW companies. 
Further, there is no significant difference in sales growth, going concern opinions and 
having Big 4 auditors between clean Section 404 companies with and without Section 302 
MW disclosures. Finally, in the MW sample, the mean values of the control variables 
generally do not differ based on the “surprise” status except that no-surprise companies are 
(1) more likely to receive going concern opinion, and (2) more likely to have had 
restatements over the last three years. 
Panel A of Table 15 provides results from univariate analysis of differences in 
shareholder voting on auditor ratification for accelerated filer companies comparing MW 
disclosing companies with clean 404(b) opinions; clean Section 404(b) companies with 
and without Section 302 MW disclosures; and negative and no-surprise MW disclosures. 
Panel B of Table 15 provides the results from the regression model. The regressions are 
statistically significant for the full sample and for the MW disclosure sample, but not for 
the clean Section 404 sample. In the first regression, the coefficient of MW indicates that 
shareholder votes to not ratify the auditor is significantly higher at companies with MW 
disclosures than at clean Section 404 companies. In the third regression, the coefficient for 
SURP indicates that shareholders are marginally more likely to vote against auditor 
ratification after surprise MW disclosures than after no-surprise MW disclosures.  
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Thus, it appears that negative surprise MW disclosures have an impact on the voting 
decisions of shareholders. I attribute this to the fact that the MW disclosure at the year-end 
is likely a surprise to shareholders. 
 
Non-Accelerated Filers 
Table 16 presents details about the differences between companies (a) with and 
without MW SOX 404 disclosures, (b) clean SOX 404 firms with and without prior Section 
302 MW disclosures, and (c) surprise and no-surprise MW disclosures for non-accelerated 
filers. Consistent with prior research, I find that companies with MW disclosures, when 
compared to companies with clean SOX 404 reports, are (1) in worse financial condition, 
(2) more likely to have auditors with shorter tenure, (3) more likely to have going concern 
modified opinion, (4) less likely to be audited by Big 4 auditors, and (5) more likely to 
have had restatements in the last three years. There is no difference in the proportion of 
votes against or abstain from auditor ratification between SOX 404 MW and clean SOX 
404 companies. 
 In the clean SOX 404 sample, companies with Section 302 MW disclosures when 
compared to companies with clean SOX 302 reports are (1) more likely to receive going 
concern opinion, (2) more likely smaller, (3) more likely in worse financial performance 
and are in worse financial condition, (4) less likely to buy non-audit services, (5) more 
likely to have had restatements in the last three years, and (6) more likely to have higher 
adverse auditor ratification votes. The mean values of the control variables generally do 
not differ based on the “surprise” status for the MW sample except that no-surprise 
companies are (1) less likely to have sales growth, and (2) more likely to have had 
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restatements over the last three years, and (3) more likely to have higher auditor ratification 
votes. 
Panel A of Table 17 provides results from univariate analysis of differences in 
shareholder voting on auditor ratification for non-accelerated filer companies comparing 
(a) SOX 404 MW disclosures with clean SOX 404 report; (b) clean SOX 404 companies 
with and without Section 302 MW disclosures; and, (c) negative and no-surprise MW 
disclosures for non-accelerated filer companies. Panel B of Table 17 provides the results 
from the regression model for the non-accelerated filer companies. The regression for the 
full sample is not significant. The regressions for clean Section 404 firms with and without 
Section 302 MW disclosures in the preceding quarters of the year indicate that non-
accelerated filer companies with clean Section 302 reports are more likely to vote against 
the auditor than those with Section 302 MW disclosures. Likewise, the regression for MW 
sample shows that no-surprise MW disclosure companies are more likely to vote against 
the auditor than surprise MW disclosure companies. 
Thus, it appears that no-surprise MW disclosures have an impact on the voting 
decisions of shareholders for the non-accelerated filer companies. This suggests that 
shareholders blame the auditor for Section 302 MWs that remain un-remediated at the end 
of the year. 
 
SUMMARY 
In this part of the dissertation, I examine the association between surprise material 
weakness disclosures and auditor dismissal, CFO turnover, and shareholders’ vote against 
auditor ratification. My findings indicate that accelerated filers that disclose Section 404 
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MW are more likely to dismiss their auditors and CFOs, and have higher proportion of 
shareholders not voting to ratify the auditor, than clean Section 404 companies. Clean SOX 
404 accelerated filer companies with prior Section 302 MW disclosures also are more 
likely to dismiss their auditors than clean SOX 404 accelerated filer companies without 
Section 302 MW disclosures. However, there is no significant difference between the two 
groups when it comes to CFO turnover or shareholder auditor ratification vote. There is no 
significant difference between negative surprise and no-surprise SOX 404 MW accelerated 
filer companies in auditor dismissal and CFO turnover. This suggests that the likelihood of 
auditor and CFO dismissal is the same between negative surprise and no surprise SOX 404 
MW accelerated filer companies. However, my findings indicate that shareholders of 
accelerated filer companies with negative surprise SOX 404 MW are more likely to vote 
against auditor ratification than shareholders of no-surprise SOX 404 MW accelerated filer 
companies.   
When it comes to non-accelerated filer companies, the results show that companies 
with Section 404 MWs are more likely to dismiss their auditors and CFOs than clean 
Section 404 companies. However, there is no significant difference between the two groups 
as to shareholder votes on auditor ratification. Clean SOX 404 non-accelerated filer 
companies with prior Section 302 MW disclosures also are more likely to dismiss their 
auditors than non-accelerated filer companies without prior Section 302 MW disclosures. 
However, there is no significant difference between the two groups when it comes to CFO 
turnover. Shareholders of clean Section 404 non-accelerated filers without prior 302 MW 
disclosures are more likely to vote against auditor ratification than clean Section 404 non-
accelerated companies with Section 302 MW disclosures.  Further, there is no significant 
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difference between negative surprise MW and no-surprise MW non-accelerated companies 
in auditor dismissal and CFO turnover. However, shareholders of non-accelerated filer 
companies with no surprise SOX 404 MW disclosures are more likely to vote against 
auditor ratification than shareholders of negative surprise SOX 404 MW non-accelerated 
filer companies.  
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IV. SURPRISE MATERIAL WEAKNESS DISCLOSURES AND AUDIT FEES 
 
In this section, I examine the association between material weakness disclosures 
made pursuant to Sections 302 and 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (United States Congress, 
2002) and audit fees. This study focuses on audit fees for firms with SOX 404 MW 
disclosure and clean SOX 404 reports (full sample); clean SOX 404 firms with and without 
SOX 302 MW disclosures during the first three quarters of the same year (clean SOX 404 
sample); and firms with year-end SOX 404 MW disclosures with and without SOX 302 
MW disclosures during the first three quarters of the same year (MW sample). Building on 
prior research (Hermanson & Ye, 2009; Munsif et al., 2013), I refer to firms that disclose 
MWs at year end in their Section 404 filings but without prior Section 302 MW disclosures 
as “negative surprise” firms. I refer to firms that disclose MWs at year end in their Section 
404 filings with prior Section 302 MW disclosures as “no-surprise” firms. On the other 
hand, I refer to firms that disclosed Section 302 MW during the first three quarters of the 
year and issue clean Section 404 reports as “positive surprise” firms. 
In 2010,  the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB, 2010b) 
issued Auditing Standard No. 12 on auditor’s assessment of risks related to material 
misstatement. Paragraphs 18-40 discusses risk assessment related to internal control over 
financial reporting.  The language on auditor’s risk assessment included the following 
excerpt taken from Paragraphs 4 and 5: 
4. The auditor should perform risk assessment procedures that are sufficient 
to provide a reasonable basis for identifying and assessing the risks of 
material misstatement, whether due to error or fraud, and designing 
further audit procedures.  
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5. Risks of material misstatement can arise from a variety of sources, 
including external factors, such as conditions in the company's industry 
and environment, and company-specific factors, such as the nature of the 
company, its activities, and internal control over financial reporting. 
 
Auditors conduct risk assessment to (1) obtain an understanding of internal control, 
(2) evaluate the design of controls that are relevant to the audit and determine whether the 
controls have been implemented, (3) obtain an understanding of the company's control 
environment, (4) obtain an understanding of management's process for identifying risks 
relevant to financial reporting objectives, (5) obtain an understanding of the information 
system, (6) obtain an understanding of control activities, (7) perform walkthroughs as part 
of obtaining an understanding of internal control over financial reporting, and (8) test 
controls for the purpose of assessing control risk. The presence of a material weakness 
creates significant additional work for auditors such as testing and changes in the audit 
program, discussions with client management, documentation to classify a weakness as a 
material weakness as opposed to a significant deficiency (Raghunandan and Rama, 2006). 
 
BACKGROUND 
Prior Research on Internal Control Disclosures and Audit Fees 
Raghunandan & Rama (2006) examine 660 accelerated filer manufacturing firms 
with a December 31, 2004 fiscal year end that had filed their 10-Ks by May 15, 2005, and 
find that audit fees are 43 percent higher for clients with a material weakness disclosure 
compared to clients without such disclosure. Hoitash, Hoitash, & Bedard (2008) use a 
sample of 2,501 accelerated filers from November 2004 through October 2005 and find 
that: (1) audit fees are positively associated with Section 404 ICFR problems, (2) audit fees 
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are adjusted for problem severity in the 404 period documenting a significant association 
of audit fees with Section 404 MW, but an insignificant association of SD, (3) significant 
associations of fees with certain pervasive problems that could potentially impact multiple 
accounts, and (4) companies disclosing internal control problems under Section 302 
continue to pay higher fees the following year even in the absence of Section 404 MW 
disclosure.  Hoitash, Hoitash, & Bedard (2008) also find that systemic weaknesses have a 
greater impact on audit fees than non-systemic weaknesses.   
Hogan & Wilkins (2008) examine audit fees prior to the implementation of SOX 
Section 404 using 284 Section 302 ICD observations and 6,451 matched industry 
observations.  Their findings indicate that audit fees are higher for clients that disclosed an 
MW pursuant to Section 302 of SOX after July 2002. 
 While the above studies examined the effect of internal control weakness 
disclosures on audit fees, Krishnan, Rama, and Zhang (2008) use a sample of 172 
companies with SOX 404 costs to analyze the total cost of compliance. They find that the 
presence of a material weakness significantly increases the total SOX 404 costs and SOX 
404 audit costs. 
  Munsif et al. (2011) examine audit fees for Section 404 for the first 4 years of 
SOX implementation. They find that remediating firms pay lower audit fee compared to 
firms that continue to disclose material weakness in internal control; however, the 
remediating firms pay, in the year of remediation as well as one and two years after 
remediation, significantly higher audit fees compared to firms that have clean Section 404 
reports in each of the first four years. Using a sample of 1451 (12,337) adverse (clean) 
Section 404 firm years from 2004-2007, Hoag and Hollingsworth (2011) find that (1) audit 
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fees decline for companies that remediate a material weakness, (2) regardless of the decline 
audit fee after remediation, audit fees are 19 percent higher three years after the initial 
remediation as compared to a sample of companies who never report an adverse 404 
opinion, and (3) fee premiums are nearly double for companies reporting consecutive 
adverse 404 opinions. 
In summary, prior research related to the association between internal control 
reporting and audit fees has concentrated mainly on accelerated filers. One exception is the 
study by Bedard, Hoitash, & Hoitash (2008) which examines the association of audit fees 
with internal control disclosures under Section 302 using 35/62/2199 ICD/SD/clean and 
152/97/2047 ICD/SD/clean non-accelerated filer companies for 2003 and 2004, 
respectively. The study finds that (1) companies disclosing Section 302 problems pay 
higher audit fees, (2) fees are adjusted for risk associated with problem severity, and (3) 
there is significant fee increase for clean companies in 2004 and that companies 
remediating internal control problems in 2003 continue to pay higher fees in 2004. 
In this section, I first establish a strong association of audit fees with internal control 
problems in: (1) SOX 404 MW disclosures compared to clean SOX 404 (full sample), and 
(2) SOX 302 MW disclosures compared to clean SOX 302 (clean SOX 404 sample).  Then, 
I examine the difference between surprise and no-surprise SOX 404 MW disclosures in 
internal control over financial reporting and audit fees using data from 2004-2016.   
 
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 Accelerated and non-accelerated filers are subject to different SOX requirements. 
The Section 302 requirement to establish and certify the effectiveness of internal control 
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infrastructure in quarterly filing with the SEC became effective for all quarterly filings on 
or after August 29, 2002 for both accelerated and non-accelerated filers. SEC annual filings 
of management report on internal control over financial report (ICFR) under Section 404(a) 
and auditor’s attestation of management report under Section 404(b) became effective for 
accelerated filers on or after November 15, 2004.  SEC annual filings of management’s 
report and certification under Section 404(a) became effective for non-accelerated filers on 
or after December 15, 2007. After a number of initial postponements of Section 404(b) 
requirements for non-accelerated filers, the Dodd-Frank Act (DFA, 2010) made the 
exemption permanent for non-accelerated filers. 
Thus, since the auditor opines on internal control over financial reporting for 
accelerated filers, the auditor’s involvement is direct. However, the auditor’s involvement 
in internal control related matters for non-accelerated filers are indirect. The auditor is 
required to “read the other information of which the auditor is aware because the credibility 
of the audited financial statements may be undermined by material inconsistencies between 
the audited financial statements and other information” per SAS 8, and SAS 118 that 
superseded SAS 8 (PCAOB, 2010a). 
Prior studies show that, the competition in the small client segment of the audit 
market is much greater post-SOX while the large-client segment of the U.S. audit market 
lacks competition (GAO, 2003; Kohlbeck, Mayhew, Murphy, & Wilkins, 2008; United 
States Treasury, 2008). Increased competition in the small audit market may mute the 
pressures on higher fees for non-accelerated filers. Since the audit needs of non-accelerated 
filers are different from those of accelerated filers, the association between material 
weaknesses in internal control and audit fees for non-accelerated filers is expected to be 
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lower than the association between material weaknesses in internal control and audit fees 
for accelerated filers. 
Given that the risk/return trade-off, auditors price audit engagements to compensate 
for the overall level of risk (Johnstone & Bedard, 2003). Because the presence of a material 
weakness indicates an increased likelihood of material misstatement, auditors of 
companies with MW in internals control undertake additional substantive testing. 
 Prior studies that examine the association between internal control quality and 
audit fees focus on accelerated filers or have used data from Section 302 disclosures. In 
this study, I first establish the differential impact of internal control weakness disclosures 
on audit fees for both non-accelerated and accelerated filers using Section 404 data. Then, 
I examine the association of Section 302 MW disclosures and audit fees by comparing 
clean Section 404 reports with and without Section 302 MW disclosures. Finally, I 
investigate the differential association of surprise and no-surprise SOX 404 MW 
disclosures and audit fees for both non-accelerated and accelerated filers. 
As prior studies have shown association between the presence of material weakness 
and higher audit fees, I expect strong association between Section 404 MWs in internal 
control and audit fees for both accelerated and non-accelerated filers. The auditor is 
expected to factor in Section 302 MW disclosures when determining audit effort, risk and 
cost. Thus, I also expect strong relationship between Section 302 MW disclosures and audit 
fees for clean Section 404 reports. Similarly, since the auditor factors in the presence of 
Section 302 MW disclosure in audit work and pricing, I expect stronger association 
between audit fees and no-surprise MW disclosures than the association between audit fees 
and surprise MW disclosures.  
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These lead to my third set of hypotheses: 
H3a:  There is a positive association between SOX 404 material weakness and 
audit fees. 
H3b:  There is a positive association between SOX 302 MW and audit fees. 
H3c:  The audit fee premium associated with no-surprise SOX 404 MW is higher 
than the audit fee premium associated with surprise SOX 404 MW. 
 
METHOD 
 I use the following model to examine the association between audit fees and material 
weaknesses in internal control:  
The dependent variable in the above regression, LAFEE is the natural log of audit 
fees. As before, I first use the full-sample and examine the difference between companies 
with clean Section 404 opinions and companies with MW disclosures: the variable of 
interest here is MW. In the second regression, the sample of companies with clean Section 
404 reports: the variable of interest here is PSURP which equals 1 if there is Section 302 
MW disclosure during the preceding quarters of the year and 0 if there is no Section 302 
MW disclosure. In the third regression, the sample includes only SOX 404 MW companies: 
the variable of interest here is SURP which equals 1 if there is no SOX 302 MW disclosure 
during the preceding quarters of the year (negative surprise) and 0 if there is SOX 302 MW 
disclosure (no-surprise).  All the other variables are defined in the appendix. 
LAFEE  = γ0 + γ1*MW (PSURP/SURP) + γ2*LNTA  + γ3*ROA + γ4*LEV + 
γ5*SEGS+ γ6*GC + γ7*INITIAL + γ8*BIG4 + γ9*XIDOP + 
γ10*FOREIGN + γ11*SPECIALIST + γ12*INVREC + γ13*CRATIO + 
 γ14*RESTATE +   γ15 -26*(Year) + γ27 -30*(Industry) + error   
(4) 
61 
The control variables are derived from prior studies (e.g., Ettredge, Emeigh, & Li, 
2014; Hoag & Hollingsworth, 2011; Munsif, Raghunandan, & Rama, 2012; Raghunandan 
& Rama, 2006) and the variables are measured as of the relevant fiscal year ends. I use 
LNTA as control variable to proxy for size; for client complexity, I use INVREC, SEGS, 
and FOREIGN. Client financial condition is measured with CRATIO, ROA, LEV and GC. 
Following much of prior audit fee research, I use the BIG4 variable for auditor type. I 
include INITIAL as prior research suggests that initial year audit clients pay a fee discount 
(e.g., Francis & Simon, 1987).  
 
RESULTS 
Accelerated Filer Companies 
Table 18 provides descriptive data for accelerated filer companies for the three 
samples. The data show that compared to clean firms, Section 404 MW firms are 
significantly smaller in size, less likely to have Big4 and/or specialist auditors, are more 
likely to have a modified opinion due to going concern, are more likely to have restatement, 
more likely to have fewer business segments, and more likely to have modified opinion 
due to factors not related to going concern. The data also show that SOX 404 MW firms 
are less profitable, as measured by ROA; more likely to have auditors in their first year of 
engagement with the company; and are more likely in the high-tech industries than clean 
SOX 404 firms. 
The second set uses the sample of clean SOX 404 reports, and examines differences 
between firms with or without SOX 302 MW disclosures.   Compared to firms with clean 
SOX 302 firms, firms with SOX 302 MWs have higher current ratio; more modified 
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opinion due to going concern; more likely to be in the high-tech industry; more likely to 
have auditors that are in their first year of engagement; and have more restatements. The 
results also show that SOX 302 MW firms have lower inventory-receivable ratio; are 
smaller in size; have fewer number of segments; and are less profitable than clean SOX 
302 firms. 
The final set compares negative surprise and no-surprise SOX 404 MW firms. The 
results show that surprise SOX 404 MW firms are less likely to have modified opinion due 
to going concern; pay less in audit fees; are less leveraged; have less restatement and less 
extra-ordinary and discontinued operations compared to no-surprise SOX 404 MW firms. 
 
Regression Results 
Table 19 presents the results for the three sample of accelerated filers. In each 
regression, the overall model is significant and the adjusted R-square is in line with those 
reported in prior audit fee studies. The first regression in Table 19 presents the results for 
the full sample which consists of accelerated filers with and without Section 404 material 
weakness. The control variables are generally significant and with the expected signs, 
except for GC. The coefficient of MW is 0.348, indicating that firms with material 
weakness in their Section 404 internal control reporting have audit fees that are 42 percent 
higher than firms with clean Section 404 opinions.7   
                                                          
7  When a firm has a material weakness in internal control in the first year, MW becomes 1. Thus, the value 
of the dependent variable in the regression increases by 0.348*1 = 0.348. In a logit regression the value of 
the dependent variable MW is log transformed, the effect of the dependent variable increasing by 0.348 is 
given by e0.348 = 1.42, or the fee increases by 42 percent compared to the situation when there is no material 
weakness in internal controls. 
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The second regression in Table 19 presents the regression results for audit fee 
analysis for clean Section 404 accelerated filers with and without prior Section 302 MW 
disclosures. Overall regression is significant, and that the coefficient of PSURP is 0.198. 
This indicates that clean accelerated filer companies with Section 302 MW disclosures 
have audit fees that are higher by 22 percent than firms with clean Section 302 opinions. 
 The third regression in Table 19 presents the regression results of the audit fee 
analysis for companies with SOX 404 MW opinions—comparing negative- and no-
surprise MW companies. The overall regression is significant and that the coefficient of 
SURP is -0.205.  This indicates that the surprise MW companies have audit fees that are 
lower by about 19 percent than no-surprise SOX 404 MW companies. This suggests that 
SOX 302 MWs prompt the auditor to increase its audit risk, and hence leads to higher audit 
effort and audit fee. The fee increase triggered by Section 302 MW disclosure might 
provide partial explanation for why surprise MW disclosures are prevalent. 
   
Non-Accelerated Filer Companies 
Descriptive Results  
Table 20 provides descriptive data for non-accelerated filer companies for the three 
samples. The first panel shows that compared to clean firms, Section 404 MW firms are 
significantly smaller in size, less likely to have Big4 and/or specialist auditors, are more 
likely to have a modified opinion due to going concern, are more likely to have restatement, 
more likely to have fewer business segments, and less likely to have modified opinion due 
to factors not related to going concern. The results also show that firms with SOX 404 
MWs are less profitable, as measured by ROA; more likely to have auditors in their first of 
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engagement with the company; more likely to be more leveraged; more likely to pay less 
in audit fees; and are less likely to be in the high-tech industries than clean SOX 404 firms. 
Further, SOX 404 MW firms have lower current ratio and lower inventory-receivable ratio 
compared to clean SOX 404 firms. 
The second panel presents the results for non-accelerated filers with clean SOX 404 
reports, partitioned by companies with and without SOX 302 MW disclosures. Compared 
to firms with clean SOX 302 reports, firms with SOX 302 MWs have more modified 
opinion due to going concern; are more likely to have auditors that are in their first year of 
engagement; and have more restatements. The results also show that SOX 302 MW firms 
are smaller in size; have fewer number of segments; are less profitable; and have marginally 
lower inventory-receivable ratio than Section 302 firms that did not disclose material 
weakness. The last panel shows the results for non-accelerated filer firms with negative- 
and no-surprise SOX 404 MWs. The results show that negative surprise SOX 404 MW 
firms have higher inventory-receivable ratio, pay less in audit fees and are less likely to 
have restatement compared to no-surprise SOX 404 MW firms. 
 
 Regression Results 
Table 21 presents the results for the three samples of non-accelerated filers. In each 
regression, the overall model is significant and the adjusted R-square is in line with those 
reported in prior audit fee studies. The first regression in Table 21 presents the regression 
results for the full sample of non-accelerated filers with and without Section 404 material 
weakness. The variable of interest is MW which takes the value of 1 if there was Section 
404 MW disclosure and 0 otherwise. The results show that there is no significant 
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association between SOX 404 MW and audit fee for non-accelerated filer companies. The 
control variables are generally significant and with the expected signs, except for GC and 
SPECIALIST.  
The second regression in Table 21 provides the results for audit fee analysis for 
clean Section 404 accelerated filers with and without Section 302 material weakness. 
PSURP is the variable of interest and takes the value of 1 if there is Section 302 MW 
disclosure, else 0. The control variables are generally significant except for INITIAL, 
SPECIALIST, and RESTATE.  The coefficient of PSURP is 0.172 indicating that, among 
clean Section 404 non-accelerated filers, companies with Section 302 MW disclosures 
have audit fees that are higher by about 19 percent. 
The third regression in Table 21 presents the results for audit fee analysis for the 
SOX 404 MW sample comparing negative- and no-surprise SOX 404 MW companies. The 
overall regression is significant, and that the coefficient of SURP is -0.129.   This indicates 
that non-accelerated filers companies with surprise SOX 404 MW have audit fees that are 
about 12 percent lower than no-surprise SOX 404 MW non-accelerated filer companies. 
This reinforces the finding in the accelerated filers case discussed above that Section 302 
MWs prompts the auditor to increase audit risk, and thus audit effort and fee are higher.  
 
SUMMARY 
In this part of the dissertation, I examine the association between surprise material 
weakness disclosures and audit fees. My findings indicate that both accelerated and non-
accelerated filers with material weakness in their Section 404 internal control reporting 
face higher audit fees. Considering only the subset of companies with clean Section 404 
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opinions, companies with Section 302 MW disclosures also pay higher fees. Finally, 
among companies reporting Section 404 MW opinions, negative-surprise companies pay 
lower fees than the no-surprise MW companies. The latter result offers a potential 
explanation for the prevalence of negative-surprise MWs, even a decade after SOX. 
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V. SURPRISE MATERIAL WEAKNESS DISCLOSURES AND AUDIT REPORT 
LAGS 
 
This study investigates the impact of surprise material weakness (MW) disclosures 
on the length of time from a company’s fiscal year-end to the audit report date—audit 
report lag (ARL).  Timely disclosure of accounting information is of paramount importance 
in making investment decisions and in the monitoring of investments.  Timeliness is one 
of the fundamental characteristics that makes financial information useful. Hence, 
regulators are concerned with timely disclosure of financial information of publicly traded 
companies for investors and other financial statement users. Consistent with such concerns, 
prior studies have shown that late disclosure of accounting information can lead to higher 
degree of information asymmetry, and lead to negative market reaction (Bamber, Bamber, 
& Schoderbek, 1993). 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (United States Congress, 2002) was enacted by 
the United States House of Representatives to restore public confidence in the capital 
market in the  aftermath of  high level accounting scandals at the onset of the 21st century. 
Policy makers believed that effective internal control helps companies to safeguard the 
company's assets, promotes efficient operations, comply with laws and regulations and 
provide reliable timely financial statements. 
SOX also addresses the need for timely financial reporting. Section 409 of SOX 
authorized the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) to require its registrants to disclose 
financial and other important information on a rapid and current basis. Section 409 amends 
Section 13 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by adding the following: 
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"(l) Real Time Issuer Disclosures.—Each issuer reporting under section 
13(a) or 15(d) shall disclose to the public on a rapid and current basis such 
additional information concerning material changes in the financial 
condition or operations of the issuer, in plain English, which may include 
trend and qualitative information and graphic presentations, as the 
Commission determines, by rule, is necessary or useful for the protection of 
investors and in the public interest.". 
 
Accordingly, the SEC ruled that large accelerated filers file annual financial 
statements in 60 days beginning with the annual report filed for the fiscal year ending on 
or after December 15, 2006. While accelerated filers will have a 75-day deadline, non-
accelerated filers continue to have a 90-day deadline to file their annual reports with the 
SEC (SEC, 2005). 
In this fourth part of my dissertation, I examine the association between MW 
disclosures and audit report lag. Following prior studies, I use audit reporting lag as a proxy 
for the overall financial reporting lag. I hypothesize that the audit reporting lag would be 
greater for firms reporting a material weakness in internal control. Specifically, I focus on 
how poor quality internal control due to surprise MW disclosures differentially impact the 
audit reporting lag for public companies by filer status: accelerated and non-accelerated. 
 
BACKGROUND  
Prior research related to Audit Report Lag  
Ashton, Willingham, & Elliott (1987), using a sample of 488 randomly selected 
clients in six industries, find that firms that received qualified audit opinion and had poorer 
internal controls faced longer audit report lags as compared to firms that did not have such 
issues. Using a sample of 465 companies listed on Toronto Stock Exchange from 1977 to 
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1982, Ashton, Graul, & Newton (1989) find that client’s total assets and auditor’s size are 
inversely related to audit delay. They also find that financial services companies had 
shorter audit delays than companies in other industries and that companies with negative 
net incomes had longer audit delays than companies with positive or zero net incomes. 
Bamber et al. (1993)  investigate the factors that determine audit report lag using 
data from 972 firms in seven industries. The results suggest that audit report lag increases 
with auditor business risk, audit complexity and other risk related factors such as loss and 
qualified opinions. Further, audit report lag decreases as incentives increase to provide the 
client with timelier audit report. Finally, audit report lag is longer for clients of structured 
audit firms than for clients of unstructured audit firms. 
Schwartz & Soo (1996) examine audit report lags and earnings announcement lags 
for firms that switch auditors. They investigate whether audit report and earnings 
announcement lags are associated with the timing of auditor changes in relation to firms’ 
fiscal year-ends. The results indicate that both audit report and earnings announcement lags 
are lower (higher) for firms that change their auditor early (late) in the fiscal year. Tanyi, 
Raghunandan, & Barua (2010) examine audit reporting lags following voluntary and 
involuntary auditor changes. They find that former Anderson clients that did not follow 
their Anderson partner to the new audit firm have significantly higher audit report lag than 
clients that voluntarily changing auditor from another BIG5 predecessor. They also find 
that clients with voluntary auditor changes have only marginally higher audit reporting lags 
compared to clients without auditor changes.  
Knechel & Payne (2001) use a propriety database containing 226 audit 
engagements, for fiscal year 1991, from an international audit firm. Their results indicate 
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that incremental audit effort, the presence of tax issues and the use of less experienced audit 
staff are positively correlated with audit report lag. Further, they find that audit report lag 
decreases due to synergistic relationship between non-audit services and audit services. 
Lee, Mande, & Son (2009) use 18,473 firm year sample to examine whether audit 
report lags are influenced by auditor tenure and the provision of non-audit services by the 
external auditor, and find that ARLs decline as auditor tenure lengthens. Dao & Pham 
(2014) use 7,291 firm-year observations from 2008 to 2010 to examine the association 
between audit firm tenure and audit report lag. They find that auditor industry 
specialization weakens the positive association between ARL and short audit firm tenure. 
Chen, Smith, Cao, & Xia (2014) use 6,381 firm year observations to examine the 
role IT capability in contributing to internal control and external audit. They find that IT 
capability directly mitigates audit fee increases, but not audit report delay increases. Pham, 
Dao, & Brown (2014) using a sample of 8,520 US firms from 2010 to 2012 examine the 
association between audit report lag and the level of investment opportunity of U.S. firms 
and find that firms with high investment opportunities are more likely to have longer audit 
report lags. 
 Some studies have examined audit report lags in non-U.S. settings. Using a sample 
of 171 companies from the Athens Stock Exchange,  Leventis, Weetman, & Caramanis, 
(2005) find that international audit firms are strongly associated with timely audit 
reporting. Bonsón-Ponte, Escobar-Rodríguez, Borrero-Domínguez, & Escobar (2008)  use 
105 companies quoted on the Spanish continuous market at the end of 2002 to 2005 and 
find that regulatory pressures and company size influence audit report lag. Using a sample 
of 502 firm-year observations from 2004 to 2008 based on New Zealand stock exchange 
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listed companies, Habib & Bhuiyan (2011) find that the audit report lag is shorter for firms 
audited by industry specialist auditors. 
 
Prior Research Related to Audit Report Lag and SOX  
Ettredge, Li, & Sun (2006) use 2,344 companies, 331 of which are with SOX 404 
MW disclosures in 2003 and 2004, to analyze the impact of internal control quality on audit 
report lag. They find that the presence of material weakness in internal control is associated 
with longer delays. Furthermore, they find that compared to specific material weaknesses, 
general (systemic) material weaknesses are associated with longer delays. Krishnan & 
Yang (2009)  use a longitudinal sample of 1,077 companies from 2001-2006 and examine 
audit report lag and earnings announcement lag. They find that audit report lag increased 
significantly from 2001 to 2006, but the increase was higher during the 2004-2006 period 
when SOX Section 404 was in effect.  
Munsif et al. (2012) use 2839 firm years from 2008 and 2009 and comparing 
accelerated and non-accelerated filers examine the association between internal control 
weaknesses and audit report lag. They find that in 2008, the increase in audit report lag in 
the presence of material weaknesses in internal control is lower for non-accelerated filers 
as compared to accelerated filers. Further, they find that the effect of a material internal 
control weakness on audit report lag is significantly lower in 2009 than in 2008 for 
accelerated filers, but not for non-accelerated filers. They also find that firms that 
remediated previosuly dislosed MW have a significant decline in audit report lag; yet, such 
firms have higher reporting lag than clean Section 404 reporting companies. 
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Impink, Lubberink, van Praag, & Veenman (2012) use a sample of 36,876 
company-years to examine the effect of Sarbanes-Oxley on 10-K filing delays. They find 
that tightened filing deadlines for accelerated and large accelerated filers are not associated 
with changes in the incidence of late filing. They also find that while Section 404 
compliance does not affect filing timeliness for firms with effective internal controls, about 
half the firms disclosing internal control weaknesses are late filer.  Lastly, the authors find 
that market reactions to late filing notifications are more negative when management 
provides no meaningful explanation for the delay. 
Thus, prior studies have examined a variety of issues related to the effects of SOX 
on audit report lag. Yet, no prior study has examined the association between surprise MW 
disclosures and audit report lag. In the fourth part of my dissertation, I investigate the 
association between material weaknesses in internal control and audit report lag. First, I 
establish the association between SOX 404 MW and audit report lag. I then examine how 
such association differs for clean SOX 404 reports with SOX 302 MWs (“positive 
surprise”) and without SOX 302 MW disclosures, and SOX 404 MW companies with and 
without prior SOX 302 MW reports—negative- and no-surprise SOX 404 MWs. 
 
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT  
In this study, first I establish the differential impact of internal control weakness 
disclosures on audit report lag for both accelerated and non-accelerated filers using SOX 
404 data. Then, using clean SOX 404 reports with and without SOX 302 MW disclosures, 
I investigate the association of Section 302 MW disclosures and audit report lag. Finally, 
using a sample of companies with SOX 404 MW disclosures, I examine the differential 
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impact of negative- and no-surprise MW disclosures on audit report delay for both non-
accelerated and accelerated filers. 
As prior studies have shown association between the presence of material weakness 
and higher audit report lag, I expect a significant association between Section 404 MWs in 
internal control and audit report lag for both accelerated and non-accelerated filers.  
Section 302 MW disclosures also signal the need for heightened effort by the 
auditor to conduct more substantive testing. Thus, in the sample of clean SOX 404 
companies, I expect a significant association between SOX 302 MW disclosures and audit 
report lag than the association between clean SOX 302 reports and audit report lag. 
Finally, more audit effort might be needed for both SOX 404 MW companies with 
and without Section 302 MWs. The discovery of MW for surprise group might necessitates 
that the auditor undertakes more tests as is the case for determining the extent of problems 
for the no-surprise companies. Thus, I expect the association between surprise and no-
surprise MW companies and audit report lag to be the same.  
These lead to the following hypotheses: 
H4a: There is a positive association between SOX 404 material weakness 
disclosures and audit report lag. 
H4b: For the subset of firms with a clean Section 404 opinion, there is a positive 
association between SOX 302 MW disclosures and audit report lag. 
H4c: The audit report lag associated with surprise SOX 404 MW is not different 
from the audit report lag associated with no-surprise SOX 404 MW. 
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METHOD  
I use the following regression model to test my hypotheses:  
The dependent variable in the above regression, LNARL is the natural log of the 
number of days between the fiscal year-end and date of the audit report. As before, I first 
use the full sample and examine the difference between companies with clean SOX 404 
opinions and companies with SOX 404 MW disclosures: the variable of interest here is 
MW. In the second regression, the sample includes only companies with clean SOX 404 
reports: the variable of interest here is PSURP which equals 1 if there is Section 302 MW 
disclosure during the preceding quarters of the year and 0 if there is no SOX 302 MW 
disclosure. In the third regression, the sample includes only SOX 404 MW companies: the 
variable of interest here is SURP which equals 1 if there is no SOX 302 MW disclosure 
during the preceding quarters of the year (negative surprise) and 0 if there is SOX 302 MW 
disclosure (no-surprise). All the other variables are defined in the appendix. 
All control variables are derived from prior studies (Ettredge et al., 2006; Jayanthi 
Krishnan & Yang, 2009; Tanyi et al., 2010). For the fourth part of my dissertation, I use 
the same sample as in the first two parts of the dissertation. I winsorize continuous variables 
at the 1st and the 99th percentiles.  The data selection is presented in Table 1. 
  
LNARL  = 0 + 1*MW (PSURP/SURP) + 2*AUCHG + 3*AUFEE +  
4*GC + 5*HITECH + 6*INITIAL + 7*LNTA + 8*LEV +   
9*LOSS +10*SEGS + 11*OPIN + 12*RESTATE + 13*ROA + 
14*XIDOP +15*SPECIALIST + 16*BIG4 +  17- 28*(Year) +  
   29-32*(Industry) + error  
(5) 
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RESULTS  
Accelerated Filers 
Table 22 provides descriptive data about the variables in the audit reporting lag 
model for the three sample of accelerated filers. The first panel of Table 26 shows, in the 
full sample, that SOX 404 MW companies are significantly different from clean SOX 404 
companies in all control variables except leverage (LEV).  SOX 404 MW accelerated filers 
are more likely to have: higher auditor change (AUCHG), higher audit report lag (LNARL), 
higher audit fee (AUFEE), higher going concern audit opinion (GC), be in the high-tech 
industry (HITECH), higher initial year auditors (INITIAL), higher negative income (LOSS), 
more modified audit report not related to going concern (OPIN), higher rate of restatement 
during the year (RESTATE), and have extraordinary items and discontinued operations 
(XIDOP) than clean SOX 404 companies.  Conversely, SOX 404 MW companies are more 
likely to be smaller (LNTA), have fewer business segments (SEGS), are less profitable 
(ROA), and less likely to be audited by BIG4 auditors than clean SOX 404 companies. 
The second panel of Table 22 indicates that in the clean SOX 404 sample, 
companies with SOX 302 MWs are significantly different from clean SOX 302 companies 
in most of the control variables, except for auditor type (BIG4), leverage (LEV), modified 
opinions other than going concern related(OPIN), extraordinary items and discontinued 
operations (XIDOP) and industry specialist auditors (SPECIALIST). SOX 302 MWs are 
more likely to have: higher auditor change (AUCHG), higher audit report lag (LNARL), 
higher audit fee (AUFEE), higher going concern audit opinion (GC), be in the high-tech 
industry (HITECH), higher initial year auditors (INITIAL), higher negative income (LOSS), 
and higher rate of restatement during the year (RESTATE) than clean Section 302 
76 
companies.  Conversely, clean SOX 404 companies with SOX 302 MWs are more likely 
to be smaller (LNTA), have fewer business segments (SEGS), and are less profitable (ROA) 
than clean SOX 404 companies without SOX 302 MW disclosures.  
The last panel of Table 22 shows, in the SOX 404 MW sample, that there is no 
significant difference between surprise and no-surprise SOX 404 MW accelerated filers 
except that surprise MW companies are more likely to pay lower audit fees (AUFEE), are 
less likely to have going concern modified opinions (GC), are more likely to be less 
leveraged (LEV), less likely to have restatements (RESTATE) and less likely to have 
extraordinary items and discontinued operations (XIDOP) than no-surprise SOX 404 MW 
companies.  
 
Regression Results 
Table 23 present the results for the three samples of non-accelerated filers. In each 
regression, the overall model is significant and the adjusted R-square is in line with those 
reported in prior audit fee studies.  The first regression in Table 23 presents the results for 
the full sample which consists of accelerated filers with and without Section 404 MW 
disclosures. The coefficient of MW is 0.272, indicating that firms with material weakness 
in their Section 404 internal control reporting have increased audit report lag of 31 percent.  
The second regression in Table 23 presents the results for audit report lag analysis 
for clean Section 404 accelerated filers with and without Section 302 material weakness. 
All of the control variables are significant except for profitability (ROA). The coefficient 
of PSURP is 0.041 indicating that clean accelerated filer companies with Section 302 
material weakness face an increased audit report lag of 4 percent.  
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The third regression in Table 23 presents the results for audit report lag analysis for 
negative-surprise and no-surprise SOX 404 MW companies. SURP is the variable of 
interest and is equal to 1 if there is a negative surprise MW disclosure, and 0 if there is no-
surprise MW disclosure. The coefficient of SURP is not significant in the regression. The 
control variables are significantly different except for HITECH, LEV, LOSS, SEGS, and 
XIDOP. 
 
Non-Accelerated Filers 
Table 24 presents the mean differences and p-values for the variables in the audit 
reporting lag model for the three samples—full, clean SOX 404, and MW—for non-
accelerated filers. The first panel of Table 30 shows that Section 404 MW companies are 
significantly different from clean Section 404 companies in all control variables except that 
there is no difference in extraordinary items and discontinued operations (XIDOP).  
The second panel of Table 24 shows that the control variables for clean SOX 404 
non-accelerated filers with and without Section 302 MW disclosures behave in the same 
manner as in the clean SOX 404 accelerated filers with and without Section 302 MW 
disclosures. Notable difference between the two is, whereas HITECH is significant and 
LEV is insignificant in the case of clean SOX 404 sample of accelerated filers, HITECH 
is insignificant and LEV is significant in the case of clean SOX 404 non-accelerated filers.  
The third panel of Tables 24 shows that the control variables are not significantly different 
between non-accelerated companies with surprise and no-surprise SOX 404 MW 
disclosures. The only exception is that no-surprise non-accelerated filer companies have 
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more restatement (RESTATE) during the year than negative surprise non-accelerated 
filers.  
 
Regression Results 
Table 25 presents the regression results for the three samples of non-accelerated 
filers. In each regression, the overall model is significant and the adjusted R-square is in 
line with those reported in prior audit fee studies. The first regression in Table 25 presents 
the regression results for the full sample of non-accelerated filers with and without Section 
404 material weakness. The variable of interest is MW which takes the value of 1 if there 
was Section 404 MW disclosure and 0 otherwise. The control variables are significant 
except for ROA and SPECIALIST. The coefficient for MW is 0.185 indicating that MW 
firms face increased audit report lag of 20 percent. 
The second regression in Table 25 provides the results for audit fee analysis for 
clean SOX 404 non-accelerated filers with and without Section 302 material weakness. 
PSURP is the variable of interest and takes the value of 1 if there is Section 302 MW 
disclosure, else 0. The control variables are significant except for ROA.  The coefficient of 
PSURP is 0.057, indicating that clean Section 404 non-accelerated filer companies with 
Section 302 MW disclosures have higher audit report lag of 6 percent. 
The third regression in Table 25 presents the results for audit fee analysis for non-
accelerated filer companies with Section 404 MW opinions; the comparison is between 
negative-surprise and no-surprise MW companies. As in the case of accelerated filers, the 
coefficient of SURP is not significant in the regression. 
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SUMMARY 
In this part of the dissertation, I examine the association between the presence of 
material weaknesses in internal controls and audit report lag. My findings indicate that for 
both accelerated and non-accelerated filers the following results hold: (a) companies with 
material weakness in their Section 404 internal control reporting have higher audit report 
lag; (b) clean Section 404 filers with Section 302 MW disclosures also have higher audit 
report lag compared to companies with clean Section 302 filings; and, (c) considering only 
those companies with an adverse Section 404 report, there is no significant difference in 
audit report lag between companies with no SOX 302 MW (negative surprise) and 
companies with SOX 302 MW (no-surprise). 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (United States Congress, 2002) (SOX) was 
enacted by the United States House of Representatives to restore public confidence in the 
capital market in the aftermath of high level accounting scandals at the onset of the 21st 
century. SOX Section 302 requires that the principal executive officer and the principal 
financial officer of all public firms to certify their firm’s quarterly internal control 
disclosures. Section 404(a) mandates that management document and test internal control 
structure and issue report including an assessment of the effectiveness of internal controls 
related to financial reporting. Section 404(b) requires that a registered public accounting 
firm attest the assessment made by management. 
Two prior studies, examining initial years of Section 404 reporting by accelerated 
filers (Hermanson & Ye, 2009) and non-accelerated filers (Munsif et al., 2013), find that 
that many companies that disclosed material weaknesses in internal controls (MWs) in their 
annual Section 404 reports did not provide early warning of such problems in their Section 
302 certifications for earlier quarters of the same fiscal year. In this dissertation, I extend 
such research by examining a variety of questions related to surprise MW disclosures using 
data from 2004-2016.  
In the first part of my dissertation, I find that “negative surprise” MW disclosures 
continue to be pervasive for both accelerated and non-accelerated filers even a decade after 
SOX. Interestingly, the proportions of Section 404 MW disclosures that were negative 
surprises are higher in my study, for both accelerated and non-accelerated filers, compared 
to the two prior studies noted above. I also find that there are a small number of clean 
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Section 404 reports with 302 MW disclosures during the prior quarters of the year. 
Interestingly, even though both fractions are quite small, I find that the proportion of 
“positive” surprise MW disclosures for non-accelerated filers is higher than that of 
accelerated filers. I also find that the internal control problems in negative and no-surprise 
MW disclosures are similar except that no-surprise MW disclosures exhibit more personnel 
and systematic issues for both the accelerated and non-accelerated filer groups. Further, 
Section 302 disclosure control factors in positive and no-surprise MW disclosures are 
similar except that no-surprise MW disclosures exhibit more personnel and systematic 
issues for both the accelerated and non-accelerated filer groups.  
In the second part of my dissertation, I find that surprise MW disclosures have 
consequences to auditors and managers—although the pattern of results is not uniform. My 
findings indicate that accelerated filers disclosing Section 404 MW are more likely to 
dismiss their auditors and CFOs, and have higher adverse shareholder auditor ratification 
votes than clean Section 404 companies. Turning to the sub-sample of accelerated filers 
with clean Section 404 opinions, companies with prior Section 302 MW disclosures (i.e., 
positive surprise disclosers) also are more likely to dismiss their auditors than clean Section 
404 companies without Section 302 MW disclosures. However, there is no significant 
difference between negative surprise and no-surprise groups in auditor dismissal or CFO 
turnover. My findings, however, indicate that shareholders of accelerated filer companies 
with negative surprise MW disclosures are more likely to vote against auditor ratification 
than shareholders of no-surprise MW disclosing accelerated filer companies.   
Turning to non-accelerated filers, when using the full sample of companies, I find 
that the pattern of results is generally similar to those for accelerated filers except that there 
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is no significant difference between the two group for shareholder auditor ratification votes. 
Similarly, in the second set of analyses (comparing positive surprise Section 404 opinions 
versus no-surprise clean Section 404 opinions), the results for non-accelerated mirrors 
those for accelerated files except that there is significant difference between the two group 
when it comes to shareholder ratification vote. Finally, when considering only the sub-
sample of non-accelerated Section 404 MW firms, as with accelerated filers there is no 
significant difference between negative surprise and no-surprise non-accelerated 
companies in auditor dismissal or CFO turnover. As to shareholder voting on auditor 
ratification, unlike in the case of accelerated filer companies, vote against auditor 
ratification is more likely at no-surprise non-accelerated filer companies than at negative 
surprise non-accelerated filers.  
In the third part of my dissertation, I find that surprise MW disclosures also affect 
the audit fees paid by companies.  My findings indicate that companies with Section 404 
MW disclosures have higher audit fees compared to companies with clean Section 404 
opinions. Further, considering only the subset of companies with a clean Section 404 
opinion, companies that had earlier reported MWs in Section 302 filings (that is, positive 
surprise companies) also have higher audit fees. Finally, in the subset of companies with 
an adverse Section 404 opinion, the negative surprise companies have lower audit fees; 
this provides one explanation for the continuing prevalence of negative surprise MW 
disclosures. 
In the final part of my dissertation, I find that Section 404 MW disclosures are 
associated with increased audit report lag. Further, considering only the subset of 
companies with a clean Section 404 filing, companies with Section 302 MW filings also 
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have higher audit report lag. However, in the subset of companies with an adverse Section 
404 opinion, there is no significant difference in the audit report lag of negative surprise 
and no-surprise companies. 
Section 404 of SOX has been, and continues to be, controversial. There have been 
numerous efforts by some legislators to exempt an increasing number of companies from 
complying with the requirements of Section 404 of SOX. For example, the Dodd-Frank 
Act (DFA 2010) exempted non-accelerated filers from the auditor attestation requirements 
of Section 404(b); later, the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS, 2012) provided 
exemption from Section 404(b) requirements of SOX for “emerging growth companies.” 
The latest version of the CHOICE Act, introduced in September 2016 by the Chairman of 
the House Committee on Financial Services and revised in February 2017, seeks to provide 
permanent exemption from Section 404(b) of SOX to issuers with market capitalization up 
to $500 million (McKenna, 2017; U.S. House of Representatives, 2017). Thus, Section 404 
of SOX is far from settled; hence, relevant empirical evidence, particularly related to 
companies disclosing material weaknesses (MWs) in internal control over financial 
reporting, is both necessary and relevant. The empirical evidence provided in this 
dissertation can be useful for policy debates surrounding Section 404 of SOX. 
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APPENDIX 
DEFINITIONS OF VARIABLES 
AUDIS = 1 if auditor is dismissed within one year of the audit report 
date, else 0; 
MW = 1 if there is MW in Section 404 disclosure, 0 otherwise; 
PSURP = 1 if clean Section 404 and Section 302 MW disclosure, 0 if 
clean Sections 302 & 404; 
SURP = 1 if there is a “surprise” MW disclosure, 0 if there Sections 
302 and 404 MW disclosure; 
LNTA = Natural log of client’s total assets at the end of the fiscal 
year;  
LEV = Ratio of total liabilities (LT) to total assets (AT); 
ROA  = Earnings before extraordinary items scaled by total assets;  
BM = Total common equity (CEQ) over market value (MKVALT); 
GROWTH = Change in sales over lagged sales; 
LOSS = 1 if negative net income, 0 otherwise; 
GC = 1 if company received going concern opinion, else 0; 
BIG4 = 1 if audited by one of the Big 4 auditors, else 0; 
NEWCEO = 1 if it is the first year of the CEO’s tenure, else 0; 
NEWCFO = 1 if it is the first year of the CFO’s tenure, else 0;  
LNTEN = Natural log of audit tenure at the beginning of the year; 
REST = 1 if a firm restated financial statements during the prior 3 
years, else 0;  
CFOCHG = 1 if the CFO is changed within one year of the audit report 
date, else 0; 
SEGS  = Number of business segments;  
M&A = 1 if there is a merger/acquisition transaction during the year, 
else 0;  
SIZEQ  = Size of the company, expressed in total assets deciles;  
YOUNG  = 1 if the firm age is less than 6 years, else 0;  
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DIS = 1 if the firm showed a negative net income in the previous 2 
years, else 0; 
CEO_CHAIR = 1 if the CEO also serves as chairman of the board, else 0;  
VOTE = Natural log of the ratio (Against + Abstain)/Total auditor 
ratification votes; 
NASR = Ratio of total non-audit fees to audit fees; 
INITIAL = 1 if the audit engagement is in their first year, else 0; 
XIDOP = 1 if the firm has extraordinary items on its financial 
statement, 0 otherwise; 
FOREIGN = 1 if a firm had foreign exchange income (loss), else 0; 
SPECIALIST =  1 if the firm is being audited by an industry specialist, else 0; 
LAFEE = Natural log of audit fees; 
INVREC = (Inventory + receivables total) over total assets; 
CRATIO = Current ratio (current assets over total assets); 
RESTATE = 1 if a firm restated financial statements during the current 
year, else 0; 
LNARL = Natural log of audit report lag (number of days between 
fiscal year-end and date of the audit report); 
AUCHG  = 1 if there is a new auditor engagement during the year, else 
0; 
AUFEE = total audit fees divided by total assets;  
HITECH = 1 if the firm belongs to high-tech industries (three-digit SIC 
codes 283,284, 357, 366, 367, 371, 382, 384, and 737), 0 
otherwise; 
OPIN = 1 if firm receives modified auditor’s opinion other than going 
concern, else 0; 
Year (2004-15) = Year dummies 1 for each year 2004- 2015, else 0; 
Industry (DSIC1–4) = 1 if the company has a two-digit SIC code between 1 and 19, 
else 0 (for DSIC1). DSIC2–DSIC4 are based on SICs 20–39, 
40–49, and 50–59, respectively 
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Table 1 
Sample Selection 
Panel A: ALL Reporting Firms 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Total 
SOX 404 Reports on Internal 
Control 
9,911 9,845 9,731 9,709 9,372 8,964 8,530 8,084 7,733 7,538 7,366 6,985 6,271 110,039 
Less: Foreign Companies 571 635 703 795 822 820 782 689 602 555 535 518 481 8,508 
Less: Financial Sector/SIC 60–67 2,327 2,317 2,269 2,245 2,153 2,046 1,980 1,934 1,814 1,735 1,699 1,624 1,483 25,626 
Less: Missing Financial Data & 
Total Assets Less Than $1 MM 
3,871 3,456 3,319 3,256 3,057 2,897 2,644 2,303 2,191 2,090 1,837 1,638 1,335 33,894 
Less: 3rd Quarter Restatements & 
Significant Deficiency 
Disclosures in 10-Qs 
29 33 19 11 5 4 2 10 4 3 11 6 1 138 
Less: Prior Two Years 404 MW 
Reports 
43 254 342 309 288 191 162 140 135 160 198 251 237 2,710 
Less: Non-Accelerated Firms 
before 2007 
808 877 851 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2,536 
Total Firms Years for Further 
Analysis 
2,262 2,273 2,228 3,093 3,047 3,006 2,960 3,008 2,987 2,995 3,086 2,948 2,734 36,627 
Accelerated filers 2,262 2,273 2,228 2,202 2,220 2,238 2,235 2,234 2,222 2,256 2,336 2,286 2,142 29,134 
Non-Accelerated Filers -- -- -- 891 827 768 725 774 765 739 750 662 592 7,493 
Panel B: Accelerated Filers 
              
Accelerated Filers  2,262 2,273 2,228 2,202 2,220 2,238 2,235 2,234 2,222 2,256 2,336 2,286 2,142 29,134 
Clean 404(b) Opinion  2,064 2,081 2,130 2,120 2,187 2,205 2,205 2,184 2,154 2,165 2,242 2,200 2,051 27,988 
With Material Weakness 199 192 98 82 32 33 30 50 68 91 94 86 91 1,146 
Prior-Warning In 10-Qs (“No-
Surprise MW”) 
23 43 22 21 13 7 11 4 17 19 24 29 20 253 
No Prior-Warning In 10-Qs 
(“Surprise MW”) 
176 149 76 61 19 26 19 46 51 72 70 57 71 893 
88% 78% 78% 74% 59% 79% 63% 92% 75% 79% 74% 66% 78% 78% 
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Table 1 
Sample Selection … Continued 
 
Panel C: Non-Accelerated Filers  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Total 
Non-Accelerated Filers    891 827 768 725 774 765 739 750 662 592 7,493 
Clean 404(a) Reports     815 766 731 698 682 647 632 627 599 552 6,749 
With Material Weakness     76 61 37 27 92 118 107 123 63 40 744 
Prior-Warning In 10-Qs (“No-
Surprise MW”) 
      15 9 9 8 19 27 27 29 13 13 169 
No Prior-Warning In 10-Qs 
(“Surprise MW”) 
   61 52 28 19 73 91 80 94 50 27 575 
      80% 85% 76% 70% 79% 77% 75% 76% 79% 68% 77% 
Panel D: Positive Surprise               
Clean 404(b) Opinion (Accelerated 
Filers) 
2,063 2,081 2,130 2,120 2,188 2,205 2,205 2,184 2,154 2,165 2,242 2,200 2,051 27,988 
Clean Section 302 –  
No 404 MW Disclosure 
2,055 2,033 2,083 2,088 2,162 2,183 2,196 2,166 2,139 2,150 2,205 2,172 2,031 27,663 
Prior-Warning In 10-Qs –  
No 404 MW Disclosure  
(“Positive-Surprise") 
8 48 47 32 26 22 9 18 15 15 37 28 20 325 
0.4% 2.3% 2.2% 1.5% 1.2% 1.0% 0.4% 0.8% 0.7% 0.7% 1.7% 1.3% 1.0% 1.2% 
               
Clean 404(a) Reports  
(Non-Accelerated Filers) 
   815 766 731 698 682 647 632 627 599 552 6,749 
Clean Section 302 – 
No 404 MW Disclosure 
   796 757 720 689 671 630 614 603 589 541 6,610 
Prior-Warning In 10-Qs – 
No 404 MW Disclosure  
(“Positive-Surprise") 
   19 9 11 9 11 17 18 24 10 11 139 
      2.3% 1.2% 1.5% 1.3% 1.6% 2.6% 2.8% 3.8% 1.7% 2.0% 2.1% 
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Table 2 
Internal Control Factors in SOX Section 404 MW Disclosures 
Accelerated Filers 
MW Types Reported 
Negative 
N=893 
No Surprise 
N=253 
p-value 
Accounting documentation, policy and/or procedures (17)  89.2 87.4 0.398 
Material and/or numerous auditor /YE adjustments (4)  60.5 56.1 0.214 
Accounting personnel resources, competency/training (44)  45.8 57.7 0.001 
Tax expense/benefit/deferral/other (FAS 109) issues (41)  28.2 28.9 0.844 
Revenue recognition issues (39)  26.1 36.8 0.001 
Restatement or non-reliance of company filings (5)  24.5 32.8 0.008 
Inventory, vendor and cost of sales issues (32)  21.2 29.2 0.007 
Information technology, software, security & access issues (22)  19.8 26.1 0.031 
Liabilities, payables, reserves and accrual estimate failures (33)  18.6 23.3 0.095 
Untimely or inadequate account reconciliations (12)  17.5 18.6 0.684 
Journal entry control issues (76)  16.8 26.1 0.001 
Non-routine transaction control issues (77)  16.6 19.0 0.371 
PPE, intangible or fixed asset (value/diminution) issues (16)  15.7 20.2 0.092 
Accounts/loans receivable, investments & cash issues (15)  14.2 21.3 0.006 
Segregations of duties/ design of controls (personnel) (42)  13.4 19.0 0.028 
Foreign, related party, affiliated and/or subsid issues (38)  12.8 16.2 0.158 
Unspecified/unidentified/inapplicable FASB/GAAP issues (68)  10.8 15.0 0.062 
Acquisition, merger, disposal or reorganization issues (35)  10.5 8.3 0.299 
Lease, FAS 5, legal, contingency & commit issues (3)  9.9 8.7 0.581 
Deferred, stock-based or executive comp issues (27)  9.1 13.4 0.041 
Expense recording (payroll, SG&A) issues (29)  8.1 13.0 0.015 
Fin statement, footnote, US GAAP conversion, segment disclosure (40)  7.5 9.5 0.303 
Inadequate disclosure controls (timely, accuracy, completeness) (9)  7.4 10.7 0.092 
Lease, leasehold & FAS 13 (98) (subcategory) issues (73)  7.3 5.9 0.457 
Depreciation, depletion or amortization issues (28)  6.3 4.7 0.364 
Debt, quasi-debt, warrants & equity (BCF) security issues (47)  6.0 9.5 0.055 
Capitalization of expenditures issues (14)  5.5 2.4 0.041 
Consolidation, (Fin46r/Off BS) & foreign currency translation issues (24)  5.5 6.7 0.458 
Intercompany/Investment w/ subsidiary/affiliate issues (8)  3.6 4.0 0.783 
Cash flow statement (FAS 95) classification errors (10)  3.2 4.3 0.400 
Senior management competency, tone, reliability issues (13)  3.2 8.3 0.001 
Ethical or compliance issues with personnel (21)  3.1 6.3 0.020 
Financial derivatives/hedging (FAS 133) accounting issues (30)  2.7 2.8 0.946 
Insufficient or non-existent internal audit function (18)  2.4 4.3 0.089 
Treasury Control Issues (57)  2.2 1.6 0.519 
Ineffective regulatory compliance issues (19)  1.3 1.2 0.846 
Pension and other post-retirement benefit issues (80)  1.3 2.0 0.463 
Balance sheet classification of asset issues (23)  1.2 0.4 0.249 
Management/Board/Audit Committee investigation (s) (7)  1.1 1.2 0.931 
Income statement classification, margin and EPS issues (36)  1.1 3.6 0.007 
Ineffective, non-existent or understaffed audit committee (11)  1.0 1.2 0.807 
Asset Retirement Obligation Issues (81)  0.9 1.2 0.677 
Gain or loss recognition issues (31)  0.8 1.2 0.545 
Restatement of previous 404 disclosures (43)  0.6 0.0 0.234 
Debt and/or equity classification issues (25) 0.2 0.8 0.178 
Loan covenant violations/issues (34)  0.1 0.4 0.342 
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Table 3 
Internal Control Factors in SOX Section 404 MW Disclosures 
Non-Accelerated Filers 
MW Types Reported 
Negative 
N=575 
No Surprise 
N=169 
p-value 
Accounting documentation, policy and/or procedures (17)  94.1 89.9 0.061 
Accounting personnel resources, competency/training (44)  57.9 60.9 0.482 
Unspecified/unidentified/inapplicable FASB/GAAP issues (68)  43.3 47.3 0.354 
Material and/or numerous auditor /YE adjustments (4)  42.1 30.8 0.008 
Segregations of duties/ design of controls (personnel) (42)  34.1 41.4 0.081 
Inadequate disclosure controls (timely, accuracy, completeness) (9)  15.0 11.8 0.308 
Non-routine transaction control issues (77)  14.8 17.8 0.348 
Revenue recognition issues (39)  13.2 14.2 0.742 
Restatement or non-reliance of company filings (5)  13.0 16.0 0.330 
Information technology, software, security & access issues (22)  12.5 22.5 0.001 
Tax expense/benefit/deferral/other (FAS 109) issues (41)  12.0 11.2 0.789 
Accounts/loans receivable, investments & cash issues (15)  11.3 10.7 0.813 
Inventory, vendor and cost of sales issues (32)  11.0 13.6 0.344 
Journal entry control issues (76)  10.1 16.0 0.035 
PPE, intangible or fixed asset (value/diminution) issues (16)  8.9 8.3 0.813 
Debt, quasi-debt, warrants & equity (BCF) security issues (47)  8.9 8.9 0.998 
Liabilities, payables, reserves and accrual estimate failures (33)  8.7 11.2 0.316 
Ineffective, non-existent or understaffed audit committee (11)  8.5 7.1 0.554 
Foreign, related party, affiliated and/or subsid issues (38)  8.2 8.9 0.772 
Untimely or inadequate account reconciliations (12)  8.0 7.1 0.702 
Deferred, stock-based or executive comp issues (27)  5.6 5.3 0.905 
Expense recording (payroll, SG&A) issues (29)  5.2 8.9 0.080 
Acquisition, merger, disposal or reorganization issues (35)  5.0 11.8 0.002 
Treasury Control Issues (57)  2.8 4.1 0.370 
Ineffective regulatory compliance issues (19)  2.4 2.4 0.960 
Fin statement, footnote, US GAAP conversion, segment disclosure (40)  2.4 4.7 0.121 
Lease, FAS 5, legal, contingency & commit issues (3)  2.1 2.4 0.826 
Consolidation, (Fin46r/Off BS) & foreign currency translation issues (24)  2.1 2.4 0.826 
Senior management competency, tone, reliability issues (13)  1.9 1.8 0.908 
Insufficient or non-existent internal audit function (18)  1.9 1.8 0.908 
Intercompany/Investment w/ subsidiary/affiliate issues (8)  1.7 1.8 0.976 
Cash flow statement (FAS 95) classification errors (10)  1.6 1.8 0.850 
Capitalization of expenditures issues (14)  1.6 3.6 0.107 
Ethical or compliance issues with personnel (21)  1.2 2.4 0.277 
Asset Retirement Obligation Issues (81)  1.2 1.2 0.973 
Depreciation, depletion or amortization issues (28)  1.0 4.1 0.007 
Lease, leasehold & FAS 13 (98) (subcategory) issues (73)  1.0 1.2 0.878 
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Table 4 
Internal Control Factors in SOX Section 302 MW Disclosures 
Accelerated Filers 
Disclosure Control Issues 
Positive 
N=325 
No-surprise 
N=253 
p-value 
Journal entry control issues (76) 96.6 97.2 0.672 
Revenue recognition issues (39) 20.0 36.0 0.000 
Information technology, software, security & access issues (22) 16.6 29.6 0.000 
Liabilities, payables, reserves and accrual estimate failures (33) 15.7 25.7 0.003 
Inventory, vendor and cost of sales issues (32) 15.1 25.3 0.002 
Tax expense/benefit/deferral/other (FAS 109) issues (41) 15.1 25.3 0.002 
Unspecified/unidentified/inapplicable FASB/GAAP issues (68) 14.2 19.8 0.073 
Deferred, stock-based or executive comp issues (27) 13.8 14.2 0.896 
Accounts/loans receivable, investments & cash issues (15) 10.8 20.9 0.001 
Accounting documentation, policy and/or procedures (17) 10.2 15.8 0.042 
Debt, quasi-debt, warrants & equity (BCF) security issues (47) 9.5 10.7 0.653 
PPE, intangible or fixed asset (value/diminution) issues (16) 9.2 18.2 0.002 
Cash flow statement (FAS 95) classification errors (10) 8.3 5.5 0.198 
Foreign, related party, affiliated and/or subsid issues (38) 7.7 17.8 0.000 
Expense recording (payroll, SG&A) issues (29) 6.8 10.7 0.095 
Acquisition, merger, disposal or reorganization issues (35) 6.8 10.3 0.130 
Income statement classification, margin and EPS issues (36) 6.5 3.2 0.072 
Consolidation, (Fin46r/Off BS) & foreign currency translation issues (24) 5.8 5.1 0.713 
Lease, FAS 5, legal, contingency & commit issues (3) 5.2 6.7 0.451 
Financial derivatives/hedging (FAS 133) accounting issues (30) 5.2 4.3 0.625 
Insufficient or non-existent internal audit function (18) 4.0 7.9 0.045 
Lease, leasehold & FAS 13 (98) (subcategory) issues (73) 4.0 4.7 0.664 
Intercompany/Investment w/ subsidiary/affiliate issues (8) 2.8 5.1 0.140 
Capitalization of expenditures issues (14) 2.8 2.8 0.999 
Depreciation, depletion or amortization issues (28) 2.8 4.0 0.429 
Debt and/or equity classification issues (25) 2.5 1.6 0.462 
Fin statement, footnote, US GAAP conversion, segment disclosure (40) 2.5 6.7 0.013 
Balance sheet classification of asset issues (23) 1.5 1.2 0.720 
Gain or loss recognition issues (31) 1.5 1.6 0.968 
Asset Retirement Obligation Issues (81) 1.2 0.8 0.606 
Non-routine transaction control issues (77) 0.9 2.0 0.283 
Restatement of previous 404 disclosures (43) 0.6 3.2 0.020 
Pension and other post-retirement benefit issues (80) 0.6 1.6 0.257 
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Table 5 
Internal Control Factors in SOX Section 302 MW Disclosures 
Non-Accelerated Filers 
Disclosure Control Issues 
Positive 
N=139 
No-surprise 
N=169 
p-value 
Journal entry control issues (76) 94.2 94.7 0.871 
Unspecified/unidentified/inapplicable FASB/GAAP issues (68) 36.0 54.4 0.001 
Revenue recognition issues (39) 18.0 10.7 0.065 
Debt, quasi-debt, warrants & equity (BCF) security issues (47) 15.8 10.7 0.180 
Information technology, software, security & access issues (22) 11.5 20.1 0.042 
Inventory, vendor and cost of sales issues (32) 11.5 11.2 0.942 
Tax expense/benefit/deferral/other (FAS 109) issues (41) 10.8 10.7 0.969 
Deferred, stock-based or executive comp issues (27) 10.1 4.7 0.071 
Foreign, related party, affiliated and/or subsid issues (38) 10.1 5.3 0.116 
Accounting documentation, policy and/or procedures (17) 9.4 9.5 0.974 
Liabilities, payables, reserves and accrual estimate failures (33) 9.4 8.3 0.743 
PPE, intangible or fixed asset (value/diminution) issues (16) 7.9 5.3 0.361 
Expense recording (payroll, SG&A) issues (29) 7.9 4.7 0.250 
Accounts/loans receivable, investments & cash issues (15) 7.2 7.7 0.870 
Insufficient or non-existent internal audit function (18) 6.5 11.2 0.149 
Acquisition, merger, disposal or reorganization issues (35) 5.8 9.5 0.228 
Cash flow statement (FAS 95) classification errors (10) 5.0 1.8 0.109 
Lease, FAS 5, legal, contingency & commit issues (3) 2.9 2.4 0.781 
Income statement classification, margin and EPS issues (36) 2.9 3.6 0.742 
Debt and/or equity classification issues (25) 2.2 1.2 0.503 
Financial derivatives/hedging (FAS 133) accounting issues (30) 2.2 0.6 0.229 
Gain or loss recognition issues (31) 2.2 0.6 0.229 
Intercompany/Investment w/ subsidiary/affiliate issues (8) 1.4 0.6 0.454 
Balance sheet classification of asset issues (23) 1.4 0.6 0.454 
Depreciation, depletion or amortization issues (28) 1.4 3.0 0.375 
Fin statement, footnote, US GAAP conversion, segment disclosure (40) 1.4 5.3 0.068 
Capitalization of expenditures issues (14) 0.7 3.0 0.159 
Consolidation, (Fin46r/Off BS) & foreign currency translation issues (24) 0.7 2.4 0.257 
Lease, leasehold & FAS 13 (98) (subcategory) issues (73) 0.7 0.6 0.893 
Pension and other post-retirement benefit issues (80) 0.7 0.0 0.273 
Restatement of previous 404 disclosures (43) 0.0 1.8 0.116 
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Table 6 
Mean Values - Auditor Dismissals  
Accelerated Filers 
 
VARIABLES 
Full Sample Clean SOX 404 Sample MW Sample 
SOX 404 MW  
N=1146 
Clean SOX 404 
N=27988 
p-value 
SOX 302 MW 
N=325 
Clean SOX 302 
N=27663 
p-value 
Negative Surprise 
N=893 
No-Surprise 
 N=253 
p-value 
AUDIS 0.117 0.033 0.000 0.071 0.033 0.000 0.116 0.119 0.927 
LNTA 19.942 20.671 0.000 20.081 20.678 0.000 19.912 20.052 0.141 
LEV 0.520 0.511 0.734 0.515 0.511 0.669 0.510 0.556 0.023 
ROA -0.061 -0.001 0.000 -0.072 0.000 0.000 -0.055 -0.083 0.167 
BM 0.493 0.474 0.076 0.467 0.474 0.662 0.496 0.482 0.505 
GROWTH 0.250 0.156 0.000 0.227 0.155 0.254 0.235 0.305 0.365 
LOSS 0.451 0.262 0.000 0.400 0.261 0.000 0.443 0.478 0.326 
GC 0.041 0.011 0.000 0.022 0.011 0.077 0.034 0.067 0.017 
BIG4 0.763 0.844 0.000 0.852 0.844 0.673 0.758 0.779 0.498 
NEWCEO 0.191 0.130 0.000 0.160 0.130 0.105 0.183 0.221 0.166 
NEWCFO 0.322 0.172 0.000 0.228 0.171 0.007 0.305 0.383 0.018 
LNTEN 1.540 1.749 0.000 1.599 1.750 0.000 1.542 1.534 0.812 
REST 0.325 0.188 0.000 0.686 0.182 0.000 0.234 0.648 0.000 
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Table 7 
MW Disclosures and Auditor Dismissals  
Accelerated Filers 
Panel A: Univariate Analysis 
Subsequent 
Auditor 
Dismissal 
Full Sample Clean SOX 404 Sample MW Sample 
Section 404 MW Disclosure Section 302 MW Disclosure Surprise MW Disclosure 
Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Yes 
134 
(11.7%) 
927 
(3.3%) 
23 
(7.1%) 
904 
(3.3%) 
104 
(11.7%) 
30 
(11.9%) 
No 
1012 
(88.3%) 
27061 
(96.7%) 
302 
(92.9%) 
26759 
(96.7%) 
789 
(88.3%) 
223 
(88.1%) 
 χ2 = 220.35, p-value: <.0001 χ2 = 14.55, p-value: <.001 χ2 = 0.01, p-value: 0.93 
 
  Panel B: Regression Analysis – Accelerated Filers 
VARIABLES 
Full Sample Clean SOX 404 Sample MW Sample 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
CONSTANT -0.492 0.307 -0.622 0.225 0.295 0.849 
MW 1.033 0.000     
PSURP   0.587 0.009   
SURP     0.128 0.602 
LNTA -0.179 0.000 -0.181 0.000 -0.110 0.172 
LEV 0.249 0.060 0.250 0.079 0.069 0.855 
ROA 0.313 0.098 0.330 0.109 0.129 0.795 
BM 0.259 0.000 0.298 0.000 -0.051 0.812 
GROWTH -0.160 0.014 -0.190 0.011 -0.073 0.620 
LOSS 0.262 0.003 0.287 0.003 0.084 0.712 
GC 0.030 0.904 0.297 0.261 -0.873 0.179 
BIG4 -0.133 0.137 -0.160 0.098 -0.050 0.841 
NEWCEO -0.071 0.453 -0.082 0.422 -0.005 0.984 
NEWCFO 0.124 0.119 0.159 0.065 -0.062 0.763 
LNTEN 0.022 0.676 0.043 0.446 -0.088 0.553 
REST 0.277 0.000 0.236 0.004 0.425 0.046 
       
Industry Dummies Included Included Included 
Year Dummies Included Included Included 
    
N 29134 27988 1146 
Chi-square 373.5 245.8 27.66 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.536 
Pseudo R2 0.041 0.030 0.034 
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Table 8 
Mean Values - Auditor Dismissals 
Non-Accelerated Filers 
 
VARIABLES 
Full Sample Clean SOX 404 Sample MW Sample 
SOX 404 MW  
N=744 
Clean SOX 404 
N=6749 
p-value 
SOX 302 MW 
N=139 
Clean SOX 302 
N=6610 
p-value 
Negative Surprise 
N=575 
No-Surprise 
 N=169 
p-value 
AUDIS 0.120 0.057 0.000 0.158 0.055 0.000 0.117 0.130 0.631 
LNTA 17.246 17.874 0.000 17.524 17.881 0.033 17.218 17.342 0.345 
LEV 0.732 0.538 0.000 0.670 0.535 0.000 0.736 0.717 0.763 
ROA -0.414 -0.213 0.000 -0.375 -0.209 0.000 -0.408 -0.434 0.276 
BM 0.319 0.650 0.000 0.366 0.656 0.000 0.328 0.291 0.524 
GROWTH 0.310 0.117 0.002 0.235 0.114 0.272 0.305 0.329 0.338 
LOSS 0.778 0.627 0.000 0.734 0.625 0.009 0.774 0.793 0.602 
GC 0.388 0.142 0.000 0.237 0.140 0.001 0.386 0.396 0.808 
BIG4 0.227 0.334 0.000 0.381 0.333 0.234 0.216 0.266 0.168 
NEWCEO 0.210 0.170 0.007 0.158 0.170 0.704 0.214 0.195 0.601 
NEWCFO 0.309 0.189 0.000 0.223 0.189 0.306 0.322 0.266 0.171 
LNTEN 1.240 1.462 0.000 1.361 1.464 0.090 1.241 1.238 0.996 
REST 0.249 0.188 0.000 0.561 0.180 0.000 0.209 0.385 0.000 
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Table 9 
Surprise MW Disclosures and Auditor Dismissal 
Non-Accelerated Filers 
Panel A: Univariate Analysis  
Subsequent 
Auditor 
Dismissal 
Full Sample Clean SOX 404 Sample MW Sample 
Section 404 MW Disclosure Section 302 MW Disclosure Surprise MW Disclosure 
Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Yes 
89 
(12.0%) 
388 
(5.8%) 
22 
(15.8%) 
366 
(5.5%) 
67 
(11.7%) 
23 
(13.0%) 
No 
655 
(88.0%) 
6361 
(94.2%) 
117 
(84.2%) 
6244  
(94.5%) 
508 
(88.3%) 
147 
(87.0%) 
 χ2 = 43.40, p-value: <.0001 χ2 = 26.60, p-value: <.0001 χ2 = 0.23, p-value: 0.63 
 
Panel B: Regression Analysis 
VARIABLES 
Full Sample Clean SOX 404 Sample MW Sample 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
CONSTANT -0.449 0.520 -0.988 0.201 2.053 0.295 
MW 0.684 0.000         
PSURP     1.053 0.000     
SURP         -0.183 0.517 
LNTA -0.193 0.000 -0.159 0.000 -0.364 0.000 
LEV -0.062 0.667 -0.103 0.536 0.042 0.886 
ROA 0.406 0.012 0.457 0.017 0.281 0.391 
BM 0.016 0.810 -0.016 0.828 0.257 0.125 
GROWTH -0.011 0.866 0.007 0.925 -0.030 0.799 
LOSS 0.227 0.071 0.204 0.140 0.460 0.194 
GC 0.322 0.025 0.501 0.002 -0.344 0.255 
BIG4 0.915 0.000 0.791 0.000 1.518 0.000 
NEWCEO 0.201 0.092 0.146 0.276 0.504 0.074 
NEWCFO 0.380 0.001 0.420 0.001 0.222 0.401 
LNTEN 0.071 0.303 0.108 0.160 0.018 0.911 
REST 0.131 0.275 0.109 0.422 -0.206 0.494 
              
Industry Dummies Included Included Included 
Year Dummies Included Included Included 
    
N 7493 6749 744 
Chi-square 157.1 116.7 47.19 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.007 
Pseudo R2 0.0442 0.0393 0.0866 
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Table 10 
Mean Values – CFO Turnover 
Accelerated Filers 
 
VARIABLES 
Full Sample Clean SOX 404 Sample MW Sample 
SOX 404 MW  
N=1146 
Clean SOX 404 
N=27988 
p-value 
SOX 302 MW 
N=325 
Clean SOX 302  
N=27663 
p-value 
Negative Surprise 
N=893 
No-Surprise 
 N=253 
p-value 
CFOCHG 0.265 0.153 0.000 0.188 0.153 0.080 0.254 0.304 0.111 
ROA -0.061 -0.001 0.000 -0.072 0.000 0.000 -0.055 -0.083 0.167 
LEV 0.520 0.511 0.734 0.515 0.511 0.669 0.510 0.556 0.023 
SEGS 2.353 2.531 0.002 2.249 2.534 0.003 2.355 2.344 0.970 
REST 0.325 0.188 0.000 0.686 0.182 0.000 0.234 0.648 0.000 
M&A 0.225 0.224 0.957 0.206 0.225 0.426 0.216 0.257 0.171 
SIZEQ 4.627 3.832 0.000 4.443 3.825 0.000 4.667 4.486 0.170 
YOUNG 0.112 0.063 0.000 0.191 0.061 0.000 0.095 0.170 0.001 
DIS 0.546 0.343 0.000 0.505 0.341 0.000 0.535 0.585 0.161 
GROWTH 0.250 0.156 0.000 0.227 0.155 0.254 0.235 0.305 0.365 
CEO_CHAIR 0.493 0.524 0.038 0.477 0.525 0.086 0.517 0.407 0.002 
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Table 11 
Surprise MW Disclosures and CFO Turnover 
Accelerated Filers 
 
Panel A: Univariate Analysis 
Subsequent 
Auditor 
Dismissal 
Full Sample Clean SOX 404 Sample MW Sample 
Section 404 MW Disclosure Section 302 MW Disclosure Surprise MW Disclosure 
Yes No  Yes No  Yes No  
Yes 304 
(26.5%) 
4282  
(15.3%) 
61 
(18.8%) 
4221 
 (15.3%) 
227 
(25.4%) 
77  
(30.4%) 
No  842 
(73.5%) 
23706 
(84.7%) 
264 
(81.2%) 
23442 
(84.7%) 
666 
(74.6%) 
176 
(69.6%) 
 χ2 = 104.64, p-value: <.0001 χ2 = 3.06, p-value: 0.08 χ2 = 2.54, p-value: 0.11 
 
Panel B: Regression Analysis –Accelerated Filers 
VARIABLES 
Full Sample Clean SOX 404 Sample MW Sample 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
CONSTANT -1.750 0.000 -1.755 0.000 -1.057 0.026 
MW 0.605 0.000         
PSURP     0.143 0.327     
SURP         -0.288 0.102 
ROA -0.273 0.003 -0.313 0.001 0.134 0.689 
LEV 0.052 0.426 0.090 0.188 -0.381 0.146 
SEGS 0.003 0.755 0.003 0.801 0.013 0.783 
REST 0.068 0.093 0.066 0.119 -0.022 0.890 
M&A 0.031 0.463 0.025 0.561 0.106 0.558 
SIZEQ -0.044 0.000 -0.050 0.000 0.048 0.299 
YOUNG -0.161 0.020 -0.161 0.026 -0.196 0.418 
DIS 0.226 0.000 0.226 0.000 0.226 0.151 
GROWTH 0.055 0.073 0.055 0.090 0.058 0.573 
CEO_CHAIR -0.142 0.000 -0.153 0.000 -0.005 0.972 
              
Industry Dummies Included Included Included 
Year Dummies Included Included Included 
    
N 29134 27988 1146 
Chi-square 301.1 211.6 25.92 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.523 
Pseudo R2 0.0119 0.00884 0.0195 
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Table 12 
Mean Values– CFO Turnover 
Non-Accelerated Filers 
 
VARIABLES 
Full Sample Clean SOX 404 Sample MW Sample 
SOX 404 MW  
N=744 
Clean SOX 404 
N=6749 
p-value 
SOX 302 MW 
N=139 
Clean SOX 302 
N=6610 
p-value 
Negative Surprise 
N=575 
No-Surprise 
 N=169 
p-value 
CFOCHG 0.228 0.163 0.000 0.158 0.163 0.883 0.228 0.231 0.936 
ROA -0.414 -0.213 0.000 -0.375 -0.209 0.000 -0.408 -0.434 0.276 
LEV 0.732 0.538 0.000 0.670 0.535 0.000 0.736 0.717 0.763 
SEGS 1.426 1.720 0.000 1.446 1.726 0.002 1.456 1.325 0.212 
REST 0.249 0.188 0.000 0.561 0.180 0.000 0.209 0.385 0.000 
M&A 0.145 0.111 0.005 0.151 0.110 0.127 0.139 0.166 0.390 
SIZEQ 7.239 6.764 0.000 7.036 6.758 0.047 7.263 7.160 0.309 
YOUNG 0.269 0.076 0.000 0.259 0.072 0.000 0.245 0.349 0.007 
DIS 0.853 0.716 0.000 0.799 0.715 0.030 0.850 0.864 0.664 
GROWTH 0.310 0.117 0.002 0.235 0.114 0.272 0.305 0.329 0.338 
CEO_CHAIR 0.362 0.364 0.906 0.302 0.365 0.127 0.372 0.325 0.267 
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Table 13 
Surprise MW Disclosures and CFO Turnover 
Non-Accelerated Filers 
 
Panel A: Univariate Analysis  
Subsequent 
Auditor 
Dismissal 
Full Sample Clean SOX 404 Sample MW Sample 
Section 404 MW Disclosure Section 302 MW Disclosure Surprise MW Disclosure 
Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Yes 
170 
(22.9%) 
1099 
(16.3%) 
22 
(15.8%) 
1077 
 (16.3%) 
131 
(22.8) 
39 
(23.1%) 
No 
574 
(77.1%) 
5650 
(83.7%) 
117 
(84.2%) 
5533 
(83.7%) 
444 
(77.2%) 
130 
(76.9%) 
 χ2 = 20.53, p-value: <.0001 χ2 = 0.02, p-value: 0.88 χ2 = 0.01, p-value: 0.94 
 
Panel B: Regression Analysis – Non-Accelerated Filers 
VARIABLES 
Full Sample Clean SOX 404 Sample MW Sample 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
CONSTANT -1.897 0.000 -1.917 0.000 -1.374 0.049 
MW 0.248 0.013         
PSURP     -0.253 0.297     
SURP         -0.030 0.890 
ROA -0.426 0.000 -0.450 0.000 -0.310 0.156 
LEV -0.053 0.518 -0.067 0.464 0.041 0.832 
SEGS -0.004 0.892 -0.017 0.546 0.095 0.207 
REST 0.032 0.682 0.096 0.261 -0.322 0.155 
M&A 0.365 0.000 0.312 0.003 0.495 0.047 
SIZEQ -0.070 0.000 -0.076 0.000 -0.048 0.394 
YOUNG 0.174 0.091 0.253 0.034 0.025 0.908 
DIS 0.400 0.000 0.388 0.000 0.504 0.126 
GROWTH -0.041 0.342 -0.106 0.043 0.118 0.134 
CEO_CHAIR -0.101 0.128 -0.104 0.145 -0.154 0.439 
              
Industry Dummies Included Included Included 
Year Dummies Included Included Included 
    
N 7493 6749 744 
Chi-square 161.6 137.7 32.63 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.112 
Pseudo R2 0.0237 0.023 0.0408 
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Table 14 
Mean Values – Shareholder Auditor Ratification Vote 
Accelerated Filers 
 
VARIABLES 
Full Sample Clean SOX 404 Sample MW Sample 
SOX 404 MW  
N=553 
Clean SOX 404 
N=19846 
p-value 
SOX 302 MW 
N=211 
Clean SOX 302 
N=19635 
p-value 
Negative Surprise 
N=421 
No-Surprise 
 N=132 
p-value 
BIG4 0.816 0.874 0.000 0.867 0.874 0.779 0.817 0.811 0.867 
GC 0.027 0.007 0.000 0.009 0.007 0.642 0.019 0.053 0.036 
GROWTH 0.260 0.147 0.001 0.196 0.146 0.745 0.245 0.306 0.881 
LNTA 20.216 20.883 0.000 20.203 20.890 0.000 20.221 20.200 0.924 
LNTEN 1.618 1.810 0.000 1.599 1.812 0.000 1.622 1.608 0.659 
LOSS 0.425 0.243 0.000 0.417 0.241 0.000 0.418 0.447 0.558 
NASR 0.202 0.227 0.000 0.207 0.227 0.087 0.210 0.177 0.126 
REST 0.331 0.183 0.000 0.668 0.178 0.000 0.238 0.629 0.000 
ROA -0.047 0.009 0.000 -0.078 0.010 0.000 -0.040 -0.067 0.289 
VOTE -0.164 -0.188 0.635 -0.363 -0.187 0.388 -0.127 -0.280 0.718 
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Table 15 
 Surprise MW Disclosures and Shareholder Auditor Ratification Vote 
Accelerated Filers 
 
Panel A: Univariate Analysis of VOTE   
 
Panel B: Regression Analysis 
VARIABLES 
Full Sample Clean SOX 404 Sample MW Sample 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
CONSTANT -3.288 0.000 -3.277 0.000 -3.700 0.001 
MW 0.149 0.005         
PSURP     0.029 0.728     
SURP         0.291 0.055 
LNTA 0.088 0.000 0.087 0.000 0.119 0.009 
BIG4 -0.255 0.000 -0.250 0.000 -0.370 0.034 
NASR 0.511 0.000 0.508 0.000 0.564 0.001 
LNTEN 0.511 0.000 0.512 0.000 0.434 0.000 
GC 0.679 0.000 0.700 0.000 0.584 0.143 
REST 0.036 0.104 0.023 0.317 0.405 0.003 
LOSS -0.063 0.018 -0.062 0.021 0.021 0.886 
GROWTH -0.116 0.000 -0.119 0.000 -0.096 0.272 
ROA -0.187 0.003 -0.174 0.006 -0.266 0.388 
              
Industry 
Dummies 
Included Included Included 
Year Dummies Included Included Included 
    
N 20399 19846 553 
F 116.8 115.3 2.907 
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Adjusted R2 0.129 0.13 0.082 
 
 Full Sample Clean SOX 404 Sample MW Sample 
 Section 404 MW Disclosure Section 302 MW Disclosure Surprise MW Disclosure 
Yes -0.164 -0.363 -0.127 
No -0.189 -0.187 -0.280 
 T = -0.40, p = 0.69 T = 1.59, p = 0.11 T = 0.95, p = 0.34 
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Table 16 
Mean Values – Shareholder Auditor Ratification Vote 
Non-Accelerated Filers 
 
VARIABLES 
Full Sample Clean SOX 404 Sample MW Sample 
SOX 404 MW  
N=166 
Clean SOX 404 
N=3015 
p-value 
SOX 302 MW 
N=45 
Clean SOX 302 
N=2970 
p-value 
Negative Surprise 
N=127 
No-Surprise 
 N=39 
p-value 
BIG4 0.265 0.332 0.074 0.356 0.332 0.736 0.244 0.333 0.272 
GC 0.235 0.111 0.000 0.244 0.109 0.004 0.228 0.256 0.720 
GROWTH 0.275 0.118 0.251 0.342 0.114 0.547 0.331 0.090 0.022 
LNTA 17.662 17.878 0.493 17.327 17.886 0.027 17.665 17.650 0.630 
LNTEN 1.355 1.490 0.026 1.401 1.491 0.320 1.347 1.381 0.800 
LOSS 0.759 0.643 0.002 0.800 0.641 0.027 0.748 0.795 0.553 
NASR 0.248 0.177 0.142 0.125 0.178 0.058 0.230 0.304 0.886 
REST 0.253 0.164 0.003 0.556 0.158 0.000 0.205 0.410 0.010 
ROA -0.332 -0.219 0.001 -0.521 -0.214 0.000 -0.325 -0.355 0.216 
VOTE 0.104 -0.029 0.133 -0.438 -0.022 0.047 -0.033 0.552 0.050 
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Table 17 
 Surprise MW Disclosures and Shareholder Auditor Ratification Vote 
Non-Accelerated Filers 
 
Panel A: Univariate Analysis of VOTE   
 
Panel D: Regression Analysis 
VARIABLES 
Full Sample Clean SOX 404 Sample MW Sample 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient  Coefficient p-value 
CONSTANT 0.787 0.110 0.696 0.164 2.520 0.373 
MW 0.046 0.704         
PSURP     -0.552 0.016     
SURP         -0.675 0.040 
LNTA -0.051 0.026 -0.050 0.033 -0.037 0.787 
BIG4 -0.323 0.000 -0.349 0.000 -0.188 0.627 
NASR 0.077 0.359 0.142 0.120 -0.172 0.463 
LNTEN 0.170 0.000 0.187 0.000 -0.110 0.546 
GC 0.280 0.004 0.281 0.005 0.650 0.119 
REST 0.124 0.089 0.146 0.055 -0.151 0.633 
LOSS 0.083 0.222 0.100 0.149 -0.557 0.122 
GROWTH -0.099 0.012 -0.054 0.194 -0.390 0.004 
ROA -0.195 0.045 -0.265 0.008 0.683 0.111 
              
Industry 
Dummies 
Included Included Included 
Year Dummies Included Included Included 
    
N 3181 3015 166 
F 6.682 7.323 1.438 
p 0.000 0.000 0.103 
Adjusted R2 0.039 0.046 0.058 
 
 Full Sample Clean SOX 404 Sample MW Sample 
 Section 404 MW Disclosure Section 302 MW Disclosure Surprise MW Disclosure 
Yes 0.104 -0.438 -0.033 
No -0.029 -0.022 0.552 
 T = -1.08, p = 0.28 T = 1.81, p = 0.07 T = -1.91, p = 0.06 
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Table 18 
Mean Values – Audit Fee Analysis 
Accelerated Filers 
VARIABLES 
Full Sample Clean SOX 404 Sample MW Sample 
SOX 404 MW  
N=1146 
Clean SOX 404 
N=27988 
p-value 
SOX 302 MW 
N=325 
Clean SOX 302  
N=27663 
p-value 
Negative Surprise 
N=893 
No-Surprise 
 N=253 
p-value 
LAFEE 14.077 14.066 0.214 14.075 14.065 0.727 14.007 14.324 0.000 
LNTA 19.942 20.671 0.000 20.081 20.678 0.000 19.912 20.052 0.141 
ROA -0.061 -0.001 0.000 -0.072 0.000 0.000 -0.055 -0.083 0.167 
LEV 0.520 0.511 0.734 0.515 0.511 0.669 0.510 0.556 0.023 
SEGS 2.353 2.531 0.002 2.249 2.534 0.003 2.355 2.344 0.970 
GC 0.041 0.011 0.000 0.022 0.011 0.077 0.034 0.067 0.017 
INITIAL 0.116 0.039 0.000 0.058 0.039 0.075 0.112 0.130 0.419 
BIG4 0.763 0.844 0.000 0.852 0.844 0.673 0.758 0.779 0.498 
XIDOP 0.207 0.183 0.044 0.160 0.184 0.275 0.194 0.253 0.040 
FOREIGN 0.361 0.324 0.009 0.326 0.324 0.943 0.358 0.372 0.700 
SPECIALIST 0.231 0.262 0.019 0.249 0.262 0.593 0.223 0.261 0.206 
INVREC 0.234 0.226 0.135 0.206 0.226 0.009 0.238 0.219 0.142 
CRATIO 0.487 0.459 0.000 0.504 0.459 0.002 0.489 0.480 0.627 
RESTATE 0.223 0.070 0.000 0.640 0.063 0.000 0.111 0.617 0.000 
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Table 19 
Audit Fee Analysis – Accelerated Filers 
  Full Sample Clean SOX 404 Sample MW Sample 
VARIABLES Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
CONSTANT 3.254 0.000 3.244 0.000 4.008 0.000 
MW 0.348 0.000         
PSURP     0.198 0.000     
SURP         -0.205 0.000 
LNTA 0.487 0.000 0.487 0.000 0.473 0.000 
ROA -0.242 0.000 -0.245 0.000 -0.159 0.069 
LEV 0.261 0.000 0.258 0.000 0.336 0.000 
SEGS 0.062 0.000 0.063 0.000 0.028 0.028 
GC 0.012 0.682 0.012 0.683 0.008 0.933 
INITIAL -0.051 0.001 -0.047 0.002 -0.103 0.086 
BIG4 0.332 0.000 0.325 0.000 0.450 0.000 
XIDOP 0.146 0.000 0.149 0.000 0.098 0.038 
FOREIGN 0.211 0.000 0.211 0.000 0.187 0.000 
SPECIALIST 0.037 0.000 0.036 0.000 0.063 0.163 
INVREC 0.236 0.000 0.236 0.000 0.330 0.009 
CRATIO 0.549 0.000 0.55 0.000 0.462 0.000 
RESTATE 0.099 0.000 0.077 0.000 0.010 0.847 
            
Industry Dummies Included  Included Included 
Year Dummies Included Included Included 
        
N 29134 27988 1146 
F 3603 3561 86.82 
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Adjusted R-square 0.788 0.792 0.692 
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Table 20 
Mean Values – Audit Fee Analysis 
Non-Accelerated Filers 
 
VARIABLES 
Full Sample Clean SOX 404 Sample MW Sample 
SOX 404 MW  
N=744 
Clean SOX 404 
N=6749 
p-value 
SOX 302 MW 
N=139 
Clean SOX 302 
N=6610 
p-value 
Negative Surprise 
N=575 
No-Surprise 
 N=169 
p-value 
LAFEE 12.254 12.521 0.000 12.631 12.519 0.072 12.201 12.434 0.052 
LNTA 17.246 17.874 0.000 17.524 17.881 0.033 17.218 17.342 0.345 
ROA -0.414 -0.213 0.000 -0.375 -0.209 0.000 -0.408 -0.434 0.276 
LEV 0.732 0.538 0.000 0.670 0.535 0.000 0.736 0.717 0.763 
SEGS 1.426 1.720 0.000 1.446 1.726 0.002 1.456 1.325 0.212 
GC 0.388 0.142 0.000 0.237 0.140 0.001 0.386 0.396 0.808 
INITIAL 0.250 0.107 0.000 0.187 0.105 0.002 0.242 0.278 0.338 
BIG4 0.227 0.334 0.000 0.381 0.333 0.234 0.216 0.266 0.168 
XIDOP 0.132 0.131 0.937 0.165 0.130 0.219 0.125 0.154 0.334 
FOREIGN 0.172 0.194 0.158 0.209 0.193 0.648 0.176 0.160 0.631 
SPECIALIST 0.059 0.095 0.001 0.079 0.095 0.527 0.057 0.065 0.710 
INVREC 0.235 0.256 0.000 0.225 0.257 0.086 0.247 0.194 0.010 
CRATIO 0.497 0.562 0.000 0.542 0.562 0.594 0.502 0.480 0.424 
RESTATE 0.137 0.060 0.000 0.424 0.052 0.000 0.089 0.302 0.000 
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Table 21 
Audit Fee Analysis – Non-Accelerated Filers 
  Full Sample Clean SOX 404 Sample MW Sample 
VARIABLES Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value 
CONSTANT 4.251 0.000 4.277 0.000 4.471 0.000 
MW 0.015 0.442         
PSURP     0.172 0.000     
SURP       -0.129 0.013 
LNTA 0.437 0.000 0.434 0.000 0.442 0.000 
ROA -0.252 0.000 -0.249 0.000 -0.273 0.000 
LEV 0.214 0.000 0.239 0.000 0.097 0.043 
SEGS 0.020 0.000 0.024 0.000 -0.008 0.637 
GC 0.022 0.246 0.053 0.009 -0.101 0.077 
INITIAL -0.041 0.020 -0.026 0.177 -0.096 0.058 
BIG4 0.557 0.000 0.540 0.000 0.737 0.000 
XIDOP 0.190 0.000 0.192 0.000 0.143 0.023 
FOREIGN 0.193 0.000 0.191 0.000 0.190 0.001 
SPECIALIST 0.011 0.629 0.014 0.526 0.014 0.894 
INVREC 0.062 0.050 0.044 0.179 0.193 0.087 
CRATIO 0.307 0.000 0.307 0.000 0.287 0.001 
RESTATE 0.067 0.003 0.021 0.407 0.108 0.096 
            
Industry Dummies Included  Included Included 
Year Dummies Included Included Included 
        
N 7493 6749 744 
F 1119 1026 107.1 
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Adjusted R-square 0.801 0.804 0.794 
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Table 22 
Mean Values - Audit Report Lag 
Accelerated Filers 
VARIABLES 
Full Sample Clean SOX 404 Sample MW Sample 
SOX 404 MW  
N=1146 
Clean SOX 404 
N=27988 
p-value 
SOX 302 MW 
N=325 
Clean SOX 302  
N=27663 
p-value 
Negative Surprise 
N=893 
No-Surprise 
 N=253 
p-value 
LNARL 4.431 4.091 0.000 4.195 4.090 0.000 4.414 4.490 0.158 
AUCHG 0.163 0.038 0.000 0.080 0.038 0.000 0.161 0.170 0.741 
AUFEE 0.005 0.002 0.000 0.004 0.002 0.000 0.004 0.006 0.034 
GC 0.041 0.011 0.000 0.022 0.011 0.077 0.034 0.067 0.017 
HITECH 0.397 0.330 0.000 0.388 0.329 0.026 0.395 0.403 0.822 
INITIAL 0.116 0.039 0.000 0.058 0.039 0.075 0.112 0.130 0.419 
LNTA 19.942 20.671 0.000 20.081 20.678 0.000 19.912 20.052 0.141 
LEV 0.520 0.511 0.734 0.515 0.511 0.669 0.510 0.556 0.023 
LOSS 0.451 0.262 0.000 0.400 0.261 0.000 0.443 0.478 0.326 
SEGS 2.353 2.531 0.002 2.249 2.534 0.003 2.355 2.344 0.970 
OPIN 0.394 0.303 0.000 0.320 0.302 0.490 0.384 0.427 0.219 
RESTATE 0.223 0.070 0.000 0.640 0.063 0.000 0.111 0.617 0.000 
ROA -0.061 -0.001 0.000 -0.072 0.000 0.000 -0.055 -0.083 0.167 
XIDOP 0.207 0.183 0.044 0.160 0.184 0.275 0.194 0.253 0.040 
SPECIALIST 0.231 0.262 0.019 0.249 0.262 0.587 0.223 0.261 0.206 
BIG4 0.763 0.844 0.000 0.852 0.844 0.673 0.758 0.779 0.498 
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Table 23 
Audit Report Lag  
Accelerated Filers 
  
VARIABLES 
Full Sample Clean SOX 404 Sample MW Sample 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
CONSTANT 4.911 0.000 4.984 0.000 3.560 0.000 
MW 0.272 0.000     
PSURP   0.041 0.000   
SURP     0.017 0.617 
AUCHG 0.031 0.000 0.030 0.000 0.057 0.083 
AUFEE 5.282 0.000 3.289 0.000 21.501 0.000 
GC 0.066 0.000 0.054 0.000 0.217 0.001 
HITECH -0.026 0.000 -0.027 0.000 0.002 0.942 
INITIAL 0.028 0.000 0.024 0.000 0.086 0.030 
LEV 0.028 0.000 0.027 0.000 0.046 0.310 
LNTA -0.043 0.000 -0.047 0.000 0.029 0.017 
LOSS 0.037 0.000 0.034 0.000 0.037 0.201 
SEGS 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.673 
OPIN 0.021 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.143 0.000 
RESTATE 0.045 0.000 0.032 0.000 0.124 0.000 
ROA 0.006 0.488 -0.013 0.108 0.154 0.016 
XIDOP 0.011 0.000 0.012 0.000 -0.022 0.477 
SPECIALIST 0.004 0.159 0.006 0.033 -0.017 0.569 
BIG4 -0.017 0.000 -0.017 0.000 -0.053 0.123 
              
Industry Dummies Included Included Included 
Year Dummies Included Included Included 
        
N 29134 27988 1146 
F 323.3 252.8 6.775 
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Adjusted R-square 0.261 0.224 0.139 
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Table 24 
Mean Values - Audit Report Lag 
Non-Accelerated Filers 
 
VARIABLES 
Full Sample Clean SOX 404 Sample MW Sample 
SOX 404 MW  
N=744 
Clean SOX 404 
N=6749 
p-value 
SOX 302 MW 
N=139 
Clean SOX 302 
N=6610 
p-value 
Negative Surprise 
N=575 
No-Surprise 
 N=169 
p-value 
LNARL 4.591 4.337 0.000 4.424 4.335 0.000 4.588 4.583 0.170 
AUCHG 0.203 0.080 0.000 0.201 0.078 0.000 0.200 0.207 0.840 
AUFEE 0.011 0.008 0.000 0.011 0.008 0.000 0.011 0.012 0.520 
GC 0.388 0.142 0.000 0.237 0.140 0.001 0.386 0.396 0.808 
HITECH 0.329 0.405 0.000 0.338 0.406 0.107 0.339 0.296 0.293 
INITIAL 0.250 0.107 0.000 0.187 0.105 0.002 0.242 0.278 0.338 
LNTA 17.246 17.873 0.000 17.524 17.881 0.033 17.218 17.342 0.345 
LEV 0.732 0.538 0.000 0.670 0.535 0.000 0.736 0.717 0.763 
LOSS 0.778 0.627 0.000 0.734 0.625 0.009 0.774 0.793 0.602 
SEGS 1.426 1.720 0.000 1.446 1.726 0.002 1.456 1.325 0.212 
OPIN 0.132 0.159 0.048 0.122 0.160 0.227 0.132 0.130 0.947 
RESTATE 0.137 0.060 0.000 0.424 0.052 0.000 0.089 0.302 0.000 
ROA -0.414 -0.213 0.000 -0.375 -0.209 0.000 -0.408 -0.434 0.276 
XIDOP 0.132 0.131 0.937 0.165 0.130 0.219 0.125 0.154 0.334 
SPECIALIST 0.059 0.095 0.001 0.079 0.095 0.527 0.057 0.065 0.710 
BIG4 0.227 0.334 0.000 0.381 0.333 0.234 0.216 0.266 0.168 
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Table 25 
Audit Report Lag  
Non-Accelerated Filers 
 
 VARIABLES 
Full Sample Clean SOX 404 Sample MW Sample 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
CONSTANT 5.015 0.000 5.066 0.000 4.789 0.000 
MW 0.185 0.000     
PSURP   0.057 0.001   
SURP     0.027 0.411 
AUCHG 0.038 0.000 0.034 0.000 0.051 0.134 
AUFEE -1.462 0.002 -1.547 0.001 -1.337 0.495 
GC 0.081 0.000 0.077 0.000 0.117 0.001 
HITECH -0.016 0.013 -0.015 0.011 -0.024 0.489 
INITIAL 0.023 0.003 0.024 0.002 0.026 0.426 
LEV 0.055 0.000 0.052 0.000 0.078 0.010 
LNTA -0.041 0.000 -0.044 0.000 -0.018 0.160 
LOSS 0.052 0.000 0.041 0.000 0.133 0.000 
SEGS 0.005 0.010 0.008 0.000 -0.011 0.330 
OPIN 0.009 0.226 0.003 0.695 0.091 0.040 
RESTATE 0.044 0.000 0.023 0.025 0.092 0.025 
ROA 0.072 0.000 0.060 0.000 0.131 0.001 
XIDOP 0.025 0.001 0.011 0.108 0.156 0.000 
SPECIALIST -0.006 0.534 -0.010 0.277 0.033 0.606 
BIG4 -0.044 0.000 -0.042 0.000 -0.077 0.090 
              
Industry Dummies Included Included Included 
Year Dummies Included Included Included 
        
N 7493 6749 744 
F 83.29 60.27 3.866 
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Adjusted R-square 0.242 0.203 0.101 
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